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CROSS-BORDER BANK BRANCHING UNDER THE 

NAFTA: PUBLIC CHOICE AND THE LAW OF 

CORPORATE GROUPS 

Eric J. Gauvin* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
When representatives of the United States, Canada, and Mexico 
signed the North American Free Trade Agreement1 (NAFTA) in 1992, 
they created the largest free trade zone in the world. 2 On items ranging 
from automobile parts to water, from saw logs to beer, the negotiators 
crafted a workable document that represented compromises by all parties, 
but which was nevertheless minimally acceptable to all. As might be 
expected, on the specific issue of trade in financial services the NAFT A 
fashioned an acceptable, but incomplete compromise. 
The promise of increased cross-border trade brings with it the need 
for cross-border financial services. In 1988, the United States-Canada 
Free Trade Agreement took the historic step of addressing trade in 
financial services in addition to trade in merchandise, and the NAFT A 
followed suit. 3 The willingness of the North American negotiators to 
address issues of trade in services marked a significant departure from 
typical trade negotiations where the focus is on the trade of goods rather 
than the trade of services.4 
* Professor of Law, Western New England College School of Law; B.A., Cornell University; 
J.D., L.L.M, Boston University School of Law. 
I. North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, U.S.-Can.-Mex., 32 LL.M. 289. 
2. See Linda Powers, NAFTA and the Regulation of Financial and Other Services, I U.S.-MEX. 
L.J. 65,66 (1993) (noting that the NAFTA is a free trade area only, not a common market). 
3. See WILLIAM R. WHITE, THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE FTA AND NAFTA FOR CANADA AND 
MEXICO 9 (1994) ('The FTA was a path-breaking agreement in that it explicitly treated the issue of 
trade in financial services and accepted the principle of national treatment rather than reciprocity."); 
see also Cally Jordan, Financial Services Under NAFTA: The View From Canada, 9 REV. OF 
BANKING AND FIN. SERVICES, Mar. 24, 1993, at 45, 51 n.39 (noting that NAFTA marks the "first ever 
principles-based approach to trade liberalization" in financial services, as opposed to the "a Ia carte 
approach pursued under the FT A"). 
4. Of course, by the time the FTA and the NAFTA were negotiated, all of the North American 
economies were solidly based on the provision of services rather than the trading of goods, so all the 
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Drafting trade agreements that cover services is always difficult 
because of issues such as defining what constitutes a service, figuring out 
where it is performed, and finding equitable treatment for labor-intensive 
as opposed to capital-intensive services.5 The challenge of drafting an 
acceptable document covering trade in financial services in North America 
was made even more daunting by the very different banking markets in the 
three signatory countries. 6 The United States and Canada have solid, well­
established banks and stable currencies, while Mexico's modem banking 
industry is still in its infancy and the peso is somewhat volatile. Canada 
and Mexico both have relatively concentrated banking markets in which 
banking organizations are free to offer a broad range of financial services, 
while the United States banking industry shares neither of those 
attributes.7 
Despite these serious obstacles, the NAFrA negotiators were able to 
agree on a framework for trade in financial services in the North American 
free trade zone. Although the NAFrA potentially covers all providers of 
financial services, this article focuses specifically on the banking industry. 
The NAFI'A gives banks from each of the member nations access to the 
banking markets of the other member nations. At present, U.S. access to 
the Mexican and Canadian markets can be accomplished only through the 
establishment of a new subsidiary. Of course, Mexican and Canadian 
banks may also expand into the United States by establishing a de novo 
bank or by acquiring an existing institution. In addition to these methods, 
however, Mexican and Canadian banks are permitted to branch into the 
United States, although like all foreign banks they are subject to an 
extensive system of U.S. regulation as part of the price of expansion 
through branching. In practice, the foreign branching regulations are so 
onerous that it often makes more sense for foreign banks to establish a 
countries recognized that they needed to address the issue. See Valerie J. McNevin, Policy 
Implications of the NAFTAfor the Financial Services Industry, 5 CoLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 
369, 377 n.37 (1994) (noting that services are the dominant U.S. export and that services account for 
60% of Mexican GOP). 
5. For a general discussion of the difficulty in negotiating agreements regarding trade in 
services, see Jeffrey Simser, GATS and Financial Services: Redefining Borders, 3 BUFF. J.INT'L L. 33 
( 1996) (relating some of the historic, economic and political forces that shaped the development of the 
General Agreement on Trade in Services). 
6. See Stephen Zamora, Comments on the Regulation ofFinancial and Legal Services in Mexico 
Under NAFTA, 1 U.S.-MEX. L.J. 77 (1993) [hereinafter Zamora, Comments] (noting the disparities 
between the U.S. and Mexican banking industries). 
7. The United States market is served by thousands of banks and thrifts, and stands almost alone 
among the Western countries in its division between commercial and investment banking. See 
WILLIAM JACKSON, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, GLASS-STEAGALL ACT!FJNANCIAL 
MODERNIZATION ISSUES IN THE 105TH CONGRESS, CRS-16 (1997). In most countries, banking 
organizations may engage in securities activities either directly through the bank itself, or, as in 
Canada, through a securities affiliate in a holding company organization. See id. 
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subsidiary rather than a branch_8 A question left open by the NAFfA, 
therefore, is whether the banks of the member nations should be permitted 
to expand across national borders through a true branch as opposed to a 
subsidiary network or the currently burdensome u_s_ branching 
-1regu atwns. 9 
This article examines the issue of cross-border branching. It starts 
with a brief overview of the banking markets and regulatory approaches in 
the three countries, then it turns to a discussion of how the NAFfA 
changed the regulatory landscape. It proceeds to examine the branching 
question in light of the theoretical considerations of enterprise liability, the 
moral hazard problem, and public choice. It concludes that in a perfect 
world, a scheme of cross-border branching would be the preferred 
approach to bank expansion in North America. However, in the real world 
the banking regulators of the member countries will be reluctant to give up 
any authority and the financial services providers in the member countries 
will do what they can to preserve the non-tariff barriers to trade that 
already exist, one of which is the restriction on branching. As a result, 
nothing will change on the NAFfA branching issue until other 
concessions, perhaps involving securities or insurance, tip the balance. 
II. THE BANKING MARKETS AND APPROACHES TO REGULATION IN THE 

NAFfA COUNTRIES 

The three NAFfA countries have three very different banking 
markets. These markets have been shaped by each country's unique 
history and politics. The regulatory schemes of the three countries have 
also molded the banking markets within their respective borders. This 
section provides a brief summary of the banking markets and the 
regulatory schemes in the three NAFfA countries. 
A. The United States 
The banking market in the United States is unusual by international 
standards. The two most distinctive features of the U.S. market are the 
large number of financial institutions and the existence of barriers between 
commercial and investment banking. To serve the twin goals of 
promoting the development of a dispersed and locally-controlled banking 
system while at the same time insulating the business of banking from 
8. See infra text accompanying notes 128-35. 
NAFTA, supra note I, art. 1403(1), 32 I.L.M. at 657 (stating that access to banking markets 
should be through the choice of juridical form chosen by the investor); NAFT A, supra note I, art. 
1403(3) (agreeing to review branching restrictions after the United States provides for nationwide 
branching). 
9 
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other commercial activities, the U.S. federal banking regulators have 
focused a significant amount of energy on the regulation of bank holding 
companies. 10 Bank holding companies evolved in the United States for a 
number of reasons, but most importantly to overcome restrictions on 
branching or interstate ownership of banks or as a way to circumvent 
We have almost 12,000 banks and thrifts in this country
restrictions on permissible bank activities.ll I will discuss these two 
aspects of the U.S. banking system in tum. 
12 -an 
extraordinarily large number by comparison to other developed countries. 
Recent consolidation in the banking industry notwithstanding, the United 
States is not home to the world's largest banks and that is in part a choice 
shaped by regulatory policy. There are many possible explanations for the 
multitude of banks, such as the ongoing constitutional struggle between 
the central government and the states, or the ingrained American distrust 
of concentrated economic power. 13 These historical and political factors 
certainly contributed to the most easily identifiable cause of having many 
banks in the United States: prohibitions on bank branching. Until quite 
recently, the United States had a patchwork quilt of branching schemes. 
Some states essentially prohibited branching and instead required that 
every banking location be a free standing, individually chartered and 
capitalized bank. The goals of this approach, called "unit banking" were 
two-fold: first, to lend stability to the banking system; and second, to 
provide insulation to country banks from the potential state-wide 
. . f . b k 14donunatton o ctty an s. 
The unit banking idea, however, was relatively easy to circumvent. 
By using a holding company, one banking organization could exercise 
10. The hallmark of U.S. federal banking regulation is the Bank Holding Company Act (the 
"BHCA"). See 12 U.S.C. §§ 1841-1848 (1997). 
II. See Robert Charles Clark, The Regulation of Financial Holding Companies, 92 HARv. L. 
REV. 787, 816-17, 822-23 (1979) (noting that bank holding companies have been employed as a 
means to achieve branching where states had restrictive branching laws, interstate ownership when 
that was not permitted by law, and entry into businesses "closely related" to banking). 
12. See General Accounting Office, Bank Oversight Structure: U.S. and Foreign Experience May 
Offer Lessons for Modernizing U.S. Structure, 21 (1996) [hereinafter GAO Oversight Structure]. 
13. See PETERS. ROSE, BANKING ACROSS STATE LiNES: PuBLIC AND PRivATE CONSEQUENCES 
1-2 ( 1997) (expressing the view that the regulatory scheme and the fear of concentrated economic 
power combined to produce the atomized U.S. banking industry). By lucky coincidence, the fact that 
banks do not dominate our national financial scheme may be at least partially responsible for the 
strong securities markets and venture capital firms in the United States that permit new companies to 
take root, prosper, and ultimately be sold off to the investing public. See Bernard S. Black and Ronald 
J. Gilson, Venture Capital and the Structure of Capital Markets: Banks Versus Stock Markets, 47 J. 
FIN. ECON. (forthcoming, 1998). 
14. This scheme is referred to as "unit banking" and the two states most closely associated with 
this approach were Texas and lllinois, but it once was the predominant approach to branching in the 
United States. See JONATHAN R. MACEY & GEOFFREY P. MILLER, BANKING LAW AND REGULATION, 
12-15 (2d ed. 1997). 
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control over a large group of separately chartered institutions. 15 During the 
Great Depression, states began to liberalize their branching statutes to 
permit state banks to branch within the state, and federal law was amended 
to give national banks the same branching privileges as state banks. 16 In 
general, however, even as branching laws became more permissive, banks 
were not permitted to branch across state lines. Even as interstate banking 
began to take hold in the late 1970s and 1980s, the only method available 
for banking organizations to enter a new state was to either form a de novo 
bank in the state or to acquire an existing bank there. 17 Of course, banking 
organizations that desired to engage in the business of banking in more 
than one state could form holding companies to own separately chartered 
institutions in different states. 18 
Today, the branching picture is very different. On the state level, 
virtually all states now permit state-wide branching. 19 On the interstate 
level, the Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act,20 
which went into effect on June 1, 1997, has essentially superseded the old 
McFadden Act and Douglas Amendment provisions. The Riegle-Neallaw 
permits nationwide interstate branching, thereby negating the requirement 
that holding companies operating in several states have a bank chartered in 
each of those states? 1 Therefore, in the current regulatory environment, 
the holding company structure is much less important for the purposes of 
overcoming branching and interstate banking restrictions?2 
15. See Clark, supra note 11, at 816-17 (noting that bank holding companies have been employed 
as a means to achieve branching where states had restrictive branching laws). 
16. See MACEY & MILLER, supra note 14, at 23, 25-26. Under the McFadden Act, 12 U.S.C. § 
36 (1988), national banks were permitted to branch only to the extent of state-chartered banks located 
in their home state. 
17. This was the result of the so-called Douglas Amendment to the Bank Holding Company Act, 
12 U.S.C. § 1842(d) (1988), which permitted interstate acquisitions only if expressly provided for in 
the banking law of the target state. See ROSE, supra note 13, at 33-35. 
18. See Clark, supra note II, at 18 (noting the use of the holding company device as a way to get 
around interstate banking restrictions). 
19. As of the end of 1994, there were no more unit banking states and only two states that did not 
permit branching on a state-wide basis. See Dean F. Arne!, Trends in the Structure of Federally 
Insured Depository Institutions, /984-94, Fed. Res. Bull. 3 (Jan. 1996). 
20. Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-328, 
108 Stat. 2338 (1994) (codified throughout Title 12 United States Code). 
21. Only Texas and Montana have opted to delay implementation of the Riegle-Neal branching 
provisions. Texas has delayed interstate branching until September 1999 and Montana has postponed 
it until October 2001. See Bill McConnell, Interstate Starts Sunday; Impact Will Take Longer, AM. 
BANKER, May 30, 1997, at 2 (noting the decision to delay in Texas and Montana). 
22. Indeed, several banking organizations have already combined their numerous state-chartered 
bank subsidiaries into one bank to take advantage of the benefits afforded by the Riegle-Neal law. 
Many large banking firms have decided to consolidate all of their bank charters into one institution, 
thereby in essence becoming single bank holding companies, or alternatively, shedding the holding 
company structure altogether to operate as a bank with subsidiaries. See Brett Chase, As Milestone 
Nears, Banks Prepare to Centralize, AM. BANKER, May 15, 1997, at 4. For example, Minneapolis­
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The other great distinguishing feature of the U.S. banking system is 
the scheme of product differentiation embodied in various state and 
federal statutes, the most notorious of which is the so-called Glass­
Steagall wall. 23 Although this law was designed to separate commercial 
banking and investment banking, in the past few years observers of the 
U.S. banking scene have witnessed significant erosion of that distinction?4 
While the role of the holding company as a component of geographic 
expansion regulation is falling away, its role in the regulation of 
permissible activities continues. The Bank Holding Company Act 
reinforces the Glass Steagall act by erecting a barrier between a bank and 
the other affiliates owned by the same corporate group. 25 Transactions 
between members of the holding company group are subject to special 
restrictions.26 The goal of the "firewalls" constructed between the bank 
and the other affiliates in the holding company is to insulate the bank 
financially and operationally from the other activities being carried on in 
based First Bank System, Inc. will combine most of its nine banks into one charter. See id. KeyCorp, 
headquartered in Cleveland, will merge its twelve bank subsidiaries into one. See id. Other banks 
taking advantage of consolidation include Wells Fargo & Co., BankAmerica Corp., and First Union 
Corp. of Charlotte. See id. 
23. The "Glass-Steagall wall" essentially consists of four key provisions, referred to by the 
section numbers the provisions had in the original Glass-Steagall Act, namely §§ 16, 20, 21 and 32. 
Section 16 limits the involvement of national banks and state banks that are members of the Federal 
Reserve System in the "dealing of stock and securities," and prohibits them from purchasing securities 
for their own account (except those approved by the Comptroller of the Currency), and from 
underwriting any issue of securities or stock. 12 U.S.C. § 24 (1988 & Supp. 1996). Section 20 
prohibits the affiliation of any member of the Federal Reserve System with any business "engaged 
principally" in the issuance, floatation, underwriting, public sale or distribution of securities. 12 
U.S.C. § 377 (1988). Section 21 is essentially the mirror image of§ 16, prohibiting persons "engaged 
in the business of issuing, underwriting, selling or distributing securities" from engaging in the 
"business of receiving deposits ...." 12 U.S.C. § 378(a)(1)(1988). Section 32 prohibits persons 
"engaged in the business of issuing, floating, underwriting, selling or distributing securities from 
serving as officers, directors or employees of Federal Reserve System member banks." 12 U.S.C. § 78 
(1988). 
24. See generally THE NEW BUSINESS OF BANKING: WHAT BANKS CAN Do NOW (Julie L. 
Williams, et a!. eds, 1996) (giving an in-depth description of the various securities and insurance 
powers permitted to commercial banks). 
25. See Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. v. Investment Co. Inst. (ICI m. 430 U.S. 46, 
71 (1981) (stating that one of the purposes of the Bank Holding Company Act was to sever the 
connection between bank holding companies and affiliates principally engaged in securities activities). 
26. Sections 23A and 23B of the Federal Reserve Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 37lc to c-1 (1994), impose 
significant restrictions on transactions among affiliates within a holding company organization. 
Section 23A restricts transactions such as loans or extensions of credit, purchase of securities or other 
assets, and the issuance of various kinds of accommodation between a bank and an affiliate unless they 
meet certain quantitative and qualitative limits. !d. Section 23B extends the restrictions in 23A by 
prohibiting certain transactions outright and subjecting additional transactions to a test that they be on 
terms comparable to those that would obtain in an arm's length transaction. See MACEY & MILLER, 
supra note 14, at 398-401. 
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the holding company organization?7 By providing that insulation, the law 
aims to avoid the "subtle hazards" and conflicts of interest that may arise 
when one organization controls a bank and other businesses that might be 
tempted to exploit the banks resources. 28 
Yet even with the restrictions contained in the BHCA, U.S. 
commercial banks already participate in a range of businesses outside of 
the traditional lending and deposit-taking activities that constitute the core 
of the commercial banking business. By statute, bank holding companies 
are allowed to participate in activities "closely related" to banking 
provided those activities produce public benefits.29 The Federal Reserve 
Board has promulgated Regulation Y to specify that "closely related" 
activities include such things as acting as investment advisor to mutual 
funds, leasing property, providing data processing services, providing 
courier services, performing real estate appraisals, providing investment 
advice on financial futures and options, and providing tax preparation 
services.30 Bank holding companies are now permitted, among other 
things, to provide discount brokerage services,31 and to underwrite (on a 
limited basis) mortgage-backed securities,32 municipal revenue bonds,33 
and corporate securities.34 Recently, the Federal Reserve Board has 
loosened the restrictions between banks and their securities affiliates 
27. See ROBERT A. EISENBEIS, Commentary, in RESTRUCTURING BANKING AND FINANCIAL 
SERVICES IN AMERICA 203, 206 (WilliamS. Haraf & Rose Marie Kushmeider eds. 1988) (describing 
the two types of insulation). 
28. See Investment Co. Inst. v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617 (1971). Possible subtle hazards that have 
been identified in the scholarly treatment of the subject include: the potential for biased advice to 
clients designed to benefit the holding company's non-banking operations; uneconomical transfers, 
such as bank loans to troubled holding company subsidiaries; bank trust department securities 
transactions designed to bolster the offerings of an investment bank affiliate; predatory practices and 
collusion between the bank and other affiliates designed to injure other competitors of the affiliates; 
and the possibility of tying arrangements by which bank services and products would only be available 
in conjunction with the purchase of affiliates' products and services, perhaps at an above-market price. 
See Daniel R. Fischel et al., The Regulation of Banks and Bank Holding Companies, 73 VA. L. REV. 
323-30 (1987) (discussing the "subtle hazards" suggested by the Camp decision); see also James R. 
Smoot, Striking Camp and Moving to Higher Ground: The Hazardous Subtleties of "Subtle Hazards" 
in Bank Regulation, 4 GEO. MASON L. REv. I, 38-40 (1995) (discussing "subtle hazards" in light of 
the Camp decision and the history of the Glass-Steagall Act). 
29. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8) (1996). 
30. 12 C.F.R. § 225.25 (1996). 
31. See Securities Industry Ass'n v. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System 
(Schwab), 468 U.S. 207 (1984); 12 C.F.R. § 225.125(h) (1997). 
32. See Citibank, 73 Fed. Res. Bull. 473 (1987), aff'd sub nom. Securities Industry Ass'n v. 
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 839 F.2d 47 (2d Cir. 1988). 
33. See Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 839 F.2d 47 (2d 
Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1059 (1988). 
34. See J.P. Morgan, 75 Fed. Res. Bull. 192, 195 (1989). 
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within the holding company structure?5 In addition, the Federal Reserve 
has completely overhauled Regulation Y, the regulation that covers bank 
holding companies, with an eye toward loosening existing restrictions and 
adding new activities to the list of those approved as being "closely related 
to banking."36 
Seeking to go further than the Federal Reserve, the Office of the 
Comptroller of the Currency recently blessed the use of operating 
subsidiaries for national banks,37 thereby making the holding company 
structure less important as a way to get around restrictions on bank 
activities.38 In light of these revolutionary changes, there is talk in 
Washington of abandoning the traditional product market distinctions 
altogether and developing the idea of "Financial Institution Holding 
Companies."39 
If recent experiences with banking reform are any guide, the success 
of the new proposals will depend in significant part on how well they 
balance the interests of the myriad state and federal regulators that have a 
35. See Review of Restrictions on Director and Employee Interlocks, Cross-Marketing Activities 
and Purchase and Sale of Financial Assets, 61 Fed. Reg. 57,679 (1996) (easing or eliminating: (I) the 
prohibition on personnel interlocks between a bank and a securities affiliate of a bank holding 
company; (2) the restrictions on joint marketing activities between a bank and a securities affiliate; and 
(3) the restrictions on the purchase and sale of financial assets between a bank and a securities 
affiliate.); Revenue Limit on Bank-Ineligible Activities of Subsidiaries of Bank Holding Companies 
Engaged in Underwriting and Dealing in Securities, 61 Fed. Reg. 68,750 (1996) (increasing from 10% 
to 25% the amount of total revenue that a nonbank subsidiary of a bank holding company may derive 
from underwriting and dealing in securities that the bank is prohibited from dealing in). 
36· Melanie L. Fein, Fed's Proposed Overhaul of Regulation Y Goes Far, But Could Be Bolder, 
15 BANKING PoL'Y. REP. 4 (Oct. 21, 1996) (describing the proposed changes to Regulation Y). The 
Fed's initiative seems to be influencing the expansion plans of players in the banking industry. See 
With Rules Eased, Banks Flock to Securities Underwriting, AM. BANKER, Aug. 18. 1997, at I (noting 
the acquisition of securities firms by large banks and the strategic changes in regional banks' plans). 
37. See 61 Fed. Reg. 60,342 to 60,387 (1996). The Comptroller of the Currency has promulgated 
a regulation that permits national banks to form operating subsidiaries that may engage in several new 
activities, such as equipment leasing, insurance, real estate brokerage, real estate development, and 
securities underwriting. See id. Given that most states have parity or "wild card" statutes which by 
law grant their state-chartered institutions powers at least as liberal as the powers given to national 
banks, see CONFERENCE OF STATE BANK SUPERVISORS,. A PROFILE OF STATE CHARTERED BANKING 
156-58 (1996), the extent of liberalized banking powers in the banking system as a whole is quite 
extensive. 
38· See McConnell, supra note 21 (noting that some banks plan to convert to a national charter, 
establish operating subsidiaries, and shed their holding company structure). 
39. As of this writing, the House of Representatives appeared to be making progress on a 
financial services modernization bill that accommodates all the necessary parties. See Jeffrey Taylor, 
House Is Close to Deal on Leveling Walls Among Banks, Securities Firms, Insurers, WALL ST. J., 
Mar. 5, 1998, at A2. It is unlikely that the House bill will be considered by the Senate in this session. 
See id. Earlier in the 105th Congress, the Financial Services Competitiveness Act of 1997, H.R. 10, 
105th Cong. (1997), the Depository Institutions and Thrift Charter Conversion Act, H.R. 268, 105th 
Cong. (1997), and the Depository Affiliation Act, H.R. 669 & S. 298, 105th Cong. (1997) were all 
proposals that would have restructured the regulation of banking to permit closer affiliations between 
banks and securities firms. 
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stake in the financial services market. At the federal level there are four 
important bank regulators, the Federal Reserve Board, the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation (FDIC), the Office of the Comptroller of the 
Currency (OCC), and the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS).40 In 
addition to the federal banking regulators, every state has a state-level 
banking regulator as well. In the securities industry, the picture is similar. 
Federal regulation is primarily the responsibility of the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC), but each state has a securities regulator to 
carry out the state "blue sky" law. In insurance, there is no federal 
regulation, just state level insurance regulators. From a political 
perspective, the changing role of bank holding companies raises 
interesting turf battles among the major federal banking regulators. 41 
Because the Federal Reserve Board is charged with supervision of bank 
holding companies while the OCC, OTS, and FDIC are focused on 
banking institutions, the Federal Reserve Board feels quite threatened by 
the declining importance of the holding company structure. The regulatory 
competition picture is more complicated, however. Because the banking 
regulatory adjustments are being made at the same time changes to Glass­
Steagall are under consideration, the turf battles will necessarily include 
the various state and federal regulators who have some involvement in the 
securities and insurance industries. The political melee may come to 
resemble the war of all against all. 
B. Canada 
Canada's banking industry presents a radical contrast to the U.S. 
banking scene. All banks are federally chartered and fall into one of two 
categories: "Schedule I" or "Schedule II" banks.42 So-called Schedule I 
banks are subject to the "widely-held" rule: no person or group may 
control more than ten percent of the voting stock of a Schedule I bank.43 
Instead of the thousands of independent banks found in the United States, 
Canada is dominated by six large Schedule I institutions with nationwide 
40. To this list some would add the Treasury Department generally. See GAO Oversight 
Structure, supra note 12, at 27. 
41. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Competition versus Consolidation: The Significance of 
Organizational Structure in Financial and Securities Regulation, 50 BUS. LAw. 447, 447-48 (1995) 
(chronicling the turf wars that erupt whenever serious proposals to reform U.S. banking law are 
advanced). 
42 See Bank Act, R.S.C., ch. B-1.01, § 14 (1996) (Can.); see also Jordan, supra note 3, at 46 
(noting that when a bank is chartered in Canada, the bank's name must be added to either Schedule I 
or Schedule II of the Bank Act). 
43. See Bank Act, R.S.C., ch. B-1.01, § 370(2) (1996) (Can.) (defining "widely held"). 
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branching networks. 44 Schedule II banks, on the other hand, may be 
closely held and owned by non-Canadians. 45 
In addition, unlike American banks but similar to their Mexican 
counterparts, Canadian banking organizations are not constrained by the 
artificial product line distinctions found in the Glass-Steagall Act. Under 
present Canadian law, banks, insurance companies, and securities firms 
are permitted to own one another and to provide services to the public 
through separate subsidiaries in a holding company structure.46 While the 
separate subsidiary requirement provides some financial insulation for the 
bank, the operational insulation required by U.S. law is lacking. 
The lines of command in the Canadian bank regulatory scheme are 
much clearer than in the American regulatory system. In Canada, a 
federal banking supervising agency whose head is appointed by the 
cabinet and who reports directly to the Minister of Finance, is the chief 
banking regulator. 47 The federal supervisor is responsible for all federally 
chartered financial institutions including banks, insurance companies and 
trust companies, while sharing responsibility with the provinces for 
oversight of securities firms. 48 The Canadian federal deposit insurer plays 
a secondary role in bank oversight, while the Bank of Canada maintains 
data on the financial system generally and on banks individually.49 
Another big difference between U.S. banks and their Canadian 
competitors is the weight of the regulatory burden shouldered by each. 
Although it is an imprecise measure, the differing volume of banking 
legislation in the two countries speaks to the difference in regulatory 
attitudes. In the early 1990s, U.S. federal banking laws and regulations 
totaled approximately 220,000 pages, while in Canada the entire Bank Act 
and associated regulations amounted to no more than 530 pages.50 This 
might not be surprising in light of the deep concern in U.S. banking policy 
44. These six institutions are the Bank of Montreal, Bank of Nova Scotia, Canadian Imperial 
Bank of Commerce, National Bank of Canada, Royal Bank of Canada, and Toronto Dominion Bank. 
See James R. Kraus, Canadian Government's Fears of Concentration Seen Threat to Megadeal, AM. 
BANKER, Feb. 12, 1998, at 20. 
45. See Jordan, supra note 3, at 48 (observing that virtually all Schedule II banks are foreign­
controlled bank subsidiaries). 
46. See id. at 50 (noting the "Canadian model" of universal banking as securities and banking 
activities being conducted through a parent-subsidiary structure). 
47. See GAO Oversight Structure, supra note 12, at 57. 
48. See id. at 62. 
49. See id. at 57. 
50. See John C. Pattison, Trade in Financial Services In NAFTA: A Public Choice Approach, in 
REGULATION AND SUPERVISION OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS IN THE NAFTA COUNTRIES AND 
BEYOND 145, 148-49 (George M. von Furstenberg ed., 1997). 
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over branching and activities, both of which are not important issues in 
Canada.5 1 
C. Mexico 
The Mexican banking system is perhaps best described as a work in 
progress. Years of political and economic turmoil in Mexico from its 
colonial past, through the tumultuous nineteenth century, and into the 
present time have stacked the odds against a stable banking system.52 
Throughout its history, Mexico has been dependent on foreign capital for 
economic development. Perhaps in an effort to reclaim Mexico from 
foreign influence, the Mexican Constitution of 1917 established 
substantial restrictions on foreign investment in Mexico, basically setting 
aside such major industries as petroleum, railways, and electricity for 
either the Mexican government or Mexican nationals.53 
Although the constitution and subsequent foreign investment laws did 
not set aside banking as a Mexican-only activity, as a practical matter the 
banking industry in Mexico was concentrated in the hands of a few 
powerful families. 54 In 1973, Mexico passed the Law for the Promotion of 
Mexican Investment and the Regulation of Foreign Investment (FIL), 
which contained a provision essentially requiring all economic enterprises 
doing business in Mexico to have 51% Mexican ownership. 55 
During the oil boom of the 1970s, Mexico incurred a huge foreign 
debt. When oil prices slid and interest rates rose in the early 1980s, 
Mexico's public and private borrowers were unable to make their 
payments.56 In a surprise move, on September 1, 1982, Mexico 
51. Another explanation for the difference is the willingness of Canada's banks to adopt 
voluntary guidelines in order to prevent the need for legislated solutions to perceived problems. See 
GAO Oversight Structure, supra note 12, at 72 (noting the voluntary adoption by Canadian banks of 
consumer and small business lending guidelines to prevent legislative solutions). 
52. Mexico won its independence from Spain in 1821, after three centuries of Spanish 
exploitation that did little to establish an independent economy in Mexico. See Carlos M. Naida, Note, 
NAFTA, Foreign Investment, and The Mexican Banking System, 26 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 
379, 380-81 (1992). In the 1800s Mexico resisted an invasion from Spain, two invasions from France 
and significant border battles and outright war with the United States. See id. 
53. See Jorge Camil, Mexico's 1989 Foreign Investment Regulations: The Cornerstone of a New 
Economic Model, 12 Hous. J. lNT' LL. I, 6 (1989). 
54. See Ewell E. Murphy, Jr., Expropriation and Aftermath: The Prospects of Foreign Enterprise 
in the Mexico of Miguel de Ia Madrid, 18 TEx. lNT'L L.J. 431, 440-41 ( 1983). 
55. See Naida, supra note 52, at 382-83. 
56. See Bronwen Davis, Comment, Mexico's Commercial Banking Industry: Can Mexico's 
Recently Privatized Banks Compete With the United States Banking Industry After Enactment of the 
North American Free Trade Agreement?, 10 ARIZ. J. OF INT'L & COMP. L. 77, 78-79 (1993) (noting 
the boom and bust cycle). 
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nationalized the banking system. 5 7 Over the next eight years, the Mexican 
government made significant economic reforms and reduced state 
ownership of industries and state control of banking. Beginning in 1990, 
Mexico reprivatized the eighteen state controlled banks, finishing the 
process in 1992 with a generous profit for the Mexican government. 58 
After reprivatization, Mexican banks grew at a furious rate. 59 Most 
banks were owned by financial groups dominated by securities firms with 
high risk tolerances. Bank managers likely felt pressure to recover the 
rich premiums paid to acquire the banks.60 Consequently, loan quality 
dropped while loan growth soared. Once the bubble-nature of the bank 
growth became clear, however, banks significantly increased their loan 
loss reserves. 61 The devaluation of the peso in late 1994, together with the 
credit quality problem, sent Mexico's banks into crisis. In response to the 
crisis, international and Mexican banking concerns took action that 
stabilized the Mexican banking system. 62 The repercussions of the 1994 
crisis are still being felt, although Mexican banks have shown a revival 
and demand for peso-denominated loans has been increasing.63 
At the time of the NAFfA's negotiation, Mexico's banking market 
was dominated by six large nationwide institutions, with seven smaller 
regional banks playing a secondary role. 64 Mexican banks may branch 
anywhere in the country. Banks may be owned by financial groups that 
57. See John P. Cogan, Jr., Privatization of the Mexican Banking System: Quetzalcoatl and the 
Bankers, 23 ST. MARY'S L.J. 753,754 (1992 ). 
58. See Davis, supra note 56, at 87-89 (chronicling the privatization process and noting that the 
Mexican government earned $12.9 billion on the sale of the banks). 
59. See Roy A Karaoglan & Mike Lubrano, Mexico's Banks After the December 1994 
Devaluation-A Chronology of the Government's Response, 16 Nw. J. INT'L L. & BUS. 24, 25-26 
(1995) (reporting that during the period 1991-94 assets of Mexican banks grew 111.3% in nominal 
terms, and 64.6% in real terms, equal to a real annual growth rate of 18.1%). 
60. See Stephen L. Auckiger, The Mexican Banking Crisis: Remedies and Opponunities, 50 
CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. 76 (1996) (reporting the dominance of the securities firms and pressure on bank 
management). 
61. See Karaoglan & Lubrano, supra note 59, at 27. 
62. See generally Javier Gavito et al., Mexico's Banking Crisis: Origins, Consequences and 
Countermeasures, in REGULATION AND SUPERVISION OF FiNANCIAL INSTITUTIONS IN THE NAFfA 
CoUNTRIES AND BEYOND (George M. von Furstenberg ed., 1997) (providing a detailed history of the 
peso crisis and the response thereto); Leslie M. Norwood, Note, International Banking-U.S. Banks 
Operating Abroad, 15 ANN. REV. BANKING L. 169, 173-174 (1996) (describing the peso devaluation 
and the subsequent international intervention to address it); Karaoglan & Lubrano, supra note 59 
(describing the government's response to the peso devaluation); see also Auckiger, supra note 60 
(outlining the regulatory changes brought about by the crisis). 
63. See Craig Torres, Mexico's Banking System Is Having A Revival-Loan Demand Rises 
Among Businesses, WALL ST. J., Jan. 28, 1998, at Al2. 
64. See Naida, supra note 52, at 388 (noting the existence of six national and seven multi-regional 
banks). 
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own other financial services firms such as securities and insurance 
. 65 compames. 
Mexico's banks and securities firms are regulated by Mexico's central 
bank, the Ministry of Finance and Public Credit and the primary regulator, 
the National Banking and Securities Commission (CNBV).66 The states of 
Mexico do not play an active role in the regulation of financial 
institutions. 
III. HOW THE NAFT A CHANGED THE LANDSCAPE 
In many ways it seems that the NAFT A banking provisions have been 
much ado about nothing. Despite the exaggerated claims, both positive 
and negative, that accompanied the passage of the NAFTA,67 the empirical 
data since the passage of the Agreement suggests that the North American 
financial services market is not radically different. 68 
The NAFT A was intended to give the member nations broad access to 
each other's markets. The banking provisions of the NAFTA are based in 
large part on the banking provisions of United States-Canada Free Trade 
Agreement (FT A). 69 The foundational ideas of both treaties are national 
treatmenC0 and most favored nation status.71 As between the United 
States and Canada, the NAFT A added little to the existing relationship 
memorialized in the FT A, but it did add important provisions framing the 
relationship of the two countries with the Mexican banking system. What 
65. See Ramon Bravo, Mexican Legal Framework Applicable to Operations Involving Financial 
Services, 25 ST. MARY's L.J. 1239, 1243 (1994) (reporting that Mexican financial groups may consist 
of general deposit warehouses, financial lessors, factoring companies, limited scope financial entities, 
exchange houses, bonding companies, insurance companies, brokerage firms and banks). 
66. See Karaoglan & Lubrano, supra note 59, at 28-29 (describing the Mexican bank regulatory 
system). 
67. See McNevin, supra note 4, at 382 (noting the "exaggerated and extravagant expectations 
regarding the possible negative and positive effects of the NAFfA"). 
68. See Daniel E. Nolle, Integration and Globalization of the Canadian and U.S. Banking 
Industries: A Modest Role for NAFTA? in REGULATION AND SUPERVISION OF FiNANCIAL 
INSTITUTIONS IN THENAFfA COUNTRIES AND BEYOND I 59, 160-64 (George M. von Furstenberg ed., 
1997) (showing that there has been no significant change in the amount of U.S. banking activity in 
Canada or Canadian banking activity in the U.S. since the passage of the NAFfA). 
69. United States-Canada Free Trade Agreement, Jan. 2, 1988, U.S.-Can., 27 I.L.M. 281. In fact, 
several provisions of the FTA were incorporated into the NAFfA by reference. See NAFfA, supra 
note I, art. 1401(4), annex 1401.4. 
70. See NAFfA, supra note I, arts. 1405, 1406. In a nutshell, national treatment means that the 
people and companies of one country will be treated in the same way and be subject only to the same 
restrictions as citizens or companies of the host country. See Kenneth L. Bachman et a!., Financial 
Services Under the North American Free Trade Agreement: An Overview, 28 lNT'L LAw. 291, 294 
(1994). 
71. See NAFfA, supra note I, art. 1406(1). Most favored nation status insures that where the 
host country confers favorable treatment to a non-NAFfA country, the NAFfA member countries will 
also receive the same favorable treatment. See Bachman eta!., supra note 70, at 295. 
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follows is a summary of the changes the NAFT A brought about within the 
confines of the existing banking regimes in the three signatory countries. 
A. The United States 
Under the NAFTA, Canada and Mexico's access to the United States 
banking market did not change in any material way. The United States 
already extended national treatment to all foreign banking organizations 
doing business in the United States.72 Before the treaty both Canadian and 
Mexican banks had access to the U.S. market on terms similar to those 
available to all other countries. Under the FfA, however, the United 
States granted Canada a concession under the Glass-Steagall act to treat 
Canadian government securities as "bank eligible" securities. 73 Under the 
NAFT A, however, the United States did not extend that same treatment to 
Mexican government securities?4 
On the other hand, Mexican financial holding companies that, as of 
January 1, 1992, owned a Mexican bank with U.S. operations and also 
owned a Mexican securities firm that owned or controlled a U.S. securities 
firm were grand-fathered to offer both brokerage and banking in the 
United States for five years without being a violation of Glass-Steagall. 75 
Otherwise, Mexican banks entering the U.S. market are treated as any 
other foreign bank doing business in the United States. 
B. Canada 
Under the FfA, U.S. banks gained preferential access to the Canadian 
banking market. Although the FfA did not make any meaningful changes 
in the access of Canadian banks to the U.S. market/6 it did provide U.S. 
banks with rights not shared by non-Canadian banks generally. In effect, 
it provided national treatment in Canada for U.S. banks that were 
established there. As a result of the FfA changes, U.S. banks were no 
longer subject to the foreign ownership restrictions of the Bank Act.77 The 
72. Although national treatment is the official view, the United States has sometimes articulated a 
policy of reciprocal national treatment. See Eric Palace, International Banking-Foreign Banks 
Operating in the United States, 14 ANN. REv. BANKING L. 154, 164 (1995). 
73. See U.S.-Canada Free Trade Act, supra note 69, art. 1702. 
74. See Bachman et al., supra note 70, at 311. 
75. See id. at 311-12 (noting that the NAFT A grandfathers some Mexican firms that already had 
both banking and securities operations prior to the enactment of the NAFT A). 
76. In fairness, by comparison to the Canadian banking market, the U.S. banking market was 
already quite open to foreign bank participation. For instance, as of 1995, banks owned by foreign 
countries controlled 20.8% of the total assets in the United States banking system, as opposed to just 
7.8% of the assets in the Canadian banking system. See Nolle, supra note 68, at 162. 
77. Those restrictions were formerly found at Bank Act, R.S.C., ch. B-1.01, § 399(1) (Can.), but 
were repealed by Ann. Stat. Can., 1994, ch. 47, § 20. 
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Bank Act now makes special provision for "NAFfA country residents."78 
The policy of national treatment as embodied in the NAFfA also 
liberalized the treatment of U.S.-owned Schedule II banks. Specifically, 
U.S. Schedule II banks are permitted to branch across Canada in the same 
streamlined fashion that Canadian banks may. 79 
Canada has not, however, become the 51st state. For many purposes, 
U.S. and Mexican banks are still foreign banks. For example, they may 
not branch directly into Canada, but may operate in Canada only through a 
Canadian-chartered Schedule II subsidiary.8° Canadian bank regulators 
apparently insisted on requiring a Canadian-chartered subsidiary in order 
to ensure that Canadian law would apply. 81 
Relating to Canada-Mexico relations, the NAFfA extended to 
Mexico the same treatment that Canada extended to the United States 
under the FfA. Most importantly, Mexican residents qualify for the 
special treatment afforded to "NAFfA country residents" under the Bank 
Act.82 Therefore, the same benefits accorded to U.S.-controlled Canadian 
banks will apply to Mexican controlled Canadian banks as well. 
C. Mexico 
Prior to the NAFfA, Mexico's banking market essentially was closed 
to American banks.83 The NAFfA changed that by permitting U.S. and 
Canadian banks to establish wholly-owned banking subsidiaries in 
Mexico.84 Given the relative weakness of Mexico's banking system 
compared to its two imposing northern neighbors, however, Mexico 
negotiated for some protections in the NAFfA to prevent foreign 
domination of the Mexican banking industry. Specifically, Mexico set out 
aggregate capital limits for foreign subsidiaries.85 In the wake of the 1994 
78. Bank Act, R.S.C., ch. B-1.01, § 11.1 (Can.). 
79. See Bank Act, R.S.C., ch. B-1.01, § 422.2 (Can.). 
80. Canada may soon consider legislation that would permit cross-border branching. See Joseph 
Weber, Just Over the Horizon: North American Banks, A Few Rule Changes would Bring a Wave of 
Cross-Border Mergers, Bus. WK., Feb. 23, 1998, at 100 (noting the expectation that the Chretien 
government will introduce branching legislation). 
81. See Jordan, supra note 3, at 48 (explaining that Canadian regulators continued to insist on 
foreign banks employing a Schedule II subsidiary in Canada in order to be assured they would have a 
Canadian entity to regulate). 
82. Bank Act, R.S.C., ch. B-1.01, § 11.1 (Can.). 
83. See Norwood, supra note 62, at 174. 
84. See Palace, supra note 72, at 161-62. 
85. When foreign banking was first permitted in 1994, foreign subsidiaries' aggregate capital 
share of the Mexican domestic market was limited to 8%. The Mexican plan called for an increasingly 
liberal scheme of foreign ownership over a six year transition period until in the last year if the 
transition foreign banks could control an aggregate of 15% of the capital in the commercial banking 
market. NAFfA, supra note I, Annex VII(B)(9), 32 I.L.M. at 774. At the end of the transition period 
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peso crisis, Mexico modified, but did not abandon, its foreign ownership 
rules to permit greater foreign influence in the banking system. 86 
After the transition period, U.S. and Canadian institutions will be 
permitted to acquire outright existing Mexican banks, subject to the 
limitation that the sum of the capital of the acquired bank and any affiliate 
of the foreign acquirer not exceed four percent of the aggregate capital of 
all commercial banks in Mexico. 87 Barring unforeseen circumstances, this 
restriction will prevent the unfriendly acquisition of Mexico's six largest 
banks since they all exceed the capital limit. 88 
IV. CROSS-BORDER BRANCHING: PUBLIC POLICY AND LEGAL THEORY 
International banking is now a fact of life. Some U.S. banking 
organizations now report that a majority of their productive assets are 
located abroad.89 As the North American market for goods and services 
becomes more integrated, there will be increasing pressure on the NAFT A 
countries to rationalize cross-border banking. Under the terms of the 
NAFT A, the time is now at hand to re-examine the issue of cross-border 
branching. Section 1403(3) of the NAFTA states: 
at such time as the United States permits commercial banks of 
another Party located in its territory to expand through 
subsidiaries or direct branches into substantially all of the United 
States market, the parties shall review and assess market access 
provided by each party ... with a view to adopting arrangements 
permitting investors of another Party to choose the juridical form 
of establishment of commercial banks.90 
Section 1403(1) stipulates that investors of a Party should be free to 
establish financial institutions in the other countries "in the juridical form 
chosen by such investor."91 The import of that provision is that banks 
the aggregate capital limits will lapse subject only to Mexico's reserved right to impose additional 
limitations on banking competition if foreign banks control 25% of the Mexican banking market 
before January 1, 2004. See Bravo, supra note 65, at 1249-51 (setting out the restrictions on foreign 
ownership of various Mexican financial institutions). 
86. See Auckiger, supra note 60, at 79 (describing changes in Mexican law that expand but do 
not eliminate the NAFfA foreign ownership limits). 
87. See NAFfA, supra note 1, Annex VII(B)(3), 32 I.L.M. at 775. 
88. See Naida, supra note 52, at 407. 
89. See William H. Lash, ill, The Decline of the Nation State in International Trade and 
Investment, 18 CARDOZO L. REv. lOll, 1017 (1996) (citing the fact that Bankers Trust reports that 
52% of its productive assets are offshore, while Citicorp reports 51% of its assets fall into that 
category). 
90. NAFfA, supra note I,§ 1403(3), 321.L.M. at 657. 
91. NAFfA, supra note 1, § 1403(1), 321.L.M. at 657. 
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should be able to expand across borders by establishing either branches or 
subsidiaries as dictated by their business plan rather than by banking law. 
Of course, branching is not the only way to cross borders. There are 
several ways in which banks located in one country may gain access to 
foreign markets. Using one approach instead of another may in part 
depend on whether the bank wants to do business "with" the foreign 
country as opposed to "in" the foreign country. In general, it is easier to 
do business with a foreign country because the legal requirements are 
relatively modest. Doing business in a foreign country frequently requires 
complying with more onerous licensing and regulatory obligations.92 Of 
course, the distinction sometimes is not clear.93 With that in mind, there 
are four major alternatives for foreign banks to deliver financial services 
across national borders. 
A. Methods ofEngaging in Cross-Border Banking 
1. Subsidiaries 
All three NAFrA countries permit banks from the other NAFrA 
countries to expand into their territory by establishing separately chartered 
subsidiaries in the host country. The subsidiary must comply with all 
licensing and regulatory requirements, including capital requirements. 
The subsidiary approach to expansion suffers from several weaknesses. 
The costs of establishing a subsidiary can be considerable. A free 
standing bank must have a complete internal infrastructure, capital base 
and management team. In addition, subsidiaries are limited somewhat in 
their lending capacity, since loan limits are typically a function of the 
amount of the bank's capital. The problem of a low lending limit can 
often be avoided through the use of loan participation agreements. 
Perhaps owing to the expense of establishing and operating subsidiaries, it 
appears that subsidiaries are less attractive than branches.94 
On the other hand, if subsidiaries are respected as legal persons 
separate and distinct from their corporate parents, they may be an effective 
92. See Guillermo Marrero, What Foreigners Should Know About the Mexican Market, in 
PRACTICING LAW INSTITUTE, NAFTA: WHAT You NEED TO KNOW Now 119, 125 (PLI Comm. Law 
& Practice Course Handbook Series No. 669, 1994) (describing the distinction between doing business 
with and doing business in Mexico). 
93. See id. (noting that, in Mexico, a business will be considered doing business in the country if 
it regularly or continuously executes commercial transactions there). 
94. See Hal S. Scott, Supervision of International Banking Post-BCCI, 8 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 487, 
491 (1992) ("The competitive superiority of branches is reflected in the fact that of the $800 billion 
total of foreign bank assets in the United States, $626 billion is in branches and agencies of foreign 
banks--only $174 billion is in subsidiaries."). 
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method for insulating the parent from liabilities ansmg out of the 
subsidiary's banking activities. 95 Indeed, the limitation of the parent's 
liability is frequently the most important reason for forming subsidiaries. 96 
Of course, limited liability is a central tenet of modem corporation law. 
Professor Blumberg has summarized the various advantages of limited 
liability in the corporate context as: permitting absentee investors to avoid 
exposure to risk; permitting large-scale enterprise; permitting diversifica­
tion of portfolios; avoiding increased agency costs; avoiding impairment 
of the efficient capital market; avoiding increased collection costs for 
creditors; avoiding the costs of contracting around liability, and the 
encouragement of risk-taking. 97 Professor Blumberg also has concluded, 
however, that many of the traditional theoretical factors justifying limited 
liability for corporations become irrelevant in the context of subsidiary 
corporations;98 and may as a matter of public policy be outweighed by the 
disadvantages of limited liability including: unfairness and inefficiency for 
tort and other involuntary creditors; unfairness and inefficiency for labor 
claimants; the encouragement of excessive risk taking; increased 
information and monitoring costs; impairment of the efficiency of the 
market; and the possibility of misrepresentation.99 Others have argued that 
the limited liability aspect of the subsidiary is economically inefficient and 
therefore undesirable. 100 
Nevertheless, in modem practice, corporations form subsidiaries for 
any number of reasons, including, in addition to the desire to limit 
liability, the need to comply with regulatory ownership requirements, a 
desire to establish certain procedural benefits, such as venue and jurisdic­
95. The idea of subsidiaries as independent legal persons is tied up in nineteenth century ideas 
about corporate personality. There have been several excellent treatments of corporate theory that 
examine the evolution of the idea of the corporation from a concession granted by the sovereign to an 
artificial person to a natural person to an aggregate of contractual interests. For general background on 
this topic, see Morton J. Horwitz, Santa Clara Revisited: The Development of Corporate Theory, 88 
W.VA. L. REV 173 (1985); HERBERT HOVENCAMP, ENTERPRISE AND AMERICAN LAW, 1836-1937, at 
12 (1991); JAMES W. HURST, THE LEGITIMACY OF THE BUSINESS CORPORATION IN THE LAW OF THE 
UNITED STATES, 1780-1970, at 4 ( 1970); David Millon, Theories of the Corporation, 1990 DUKE L.J. 
201 (1990); and Phillip I. Blumberg, The Corporate Entity in an Era of Multinational Corporations, 
15 DEL. J. CORP. L. 283 (1990). 
96. See CHESTER ROHLICH, ORGANIZING CORPORATE AND OTHER BUSINESS ENTERPRISES § 
I 0.02 (5th ed. 1975). 
97. See PHILLIP I. BLUMBERG, THE LAW OF CORPORATE GROUPS: SUBSTANTIVE LAw 66-86 
(1987); see also FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF 
CORPORATE LAW 40-62 ( 1991 ). 
98. See BLUMBERG, supra note 97, § 5.01. 
99. See id.; see also EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 97. 
100. Joseph H. Sommer, The Subsidiary: Doctrine Without a Cause?, 59 FORDHAM L. REV. 227, 
231-42 (1990). 
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tion, 101 or in the case of banking in the NAFfA countries because present 
law does not permit cross-border branching. Regardless of the reasons for 
the use of subsidiaries, it may be said that despite their separate legal 
existence they form a cohesive economic unit with their parent and related 
corporations. 
In the banking context, the ability of the parent to avoid or deflect 
liability through the use of a banking subsidiary gives rise to an especially 
pernicious moral hazard problem. 102 Holding companies might not run a 
subsidiary bank as prudently as they otherwise might because the risk of 
loss is limited to the capital invested in the subsidiary and not backed by 
the full faith and credit of the parent. In the United States, the moral 
hazard problem in the bank holding company/bank subsidiary context has 
resulted in an ongoing effort by regulators to invent new and better ways 
of imposing liability on holding companies for the failure of bank 
subsidiaries. Federal banking regulators have devised a host of legal tech­
niques designed to impose liability on bank holding companies in the 
event of bank failure. 103 
101. See ROHLICH, supra note 96 (citing various legal reasons for subsidiary formation such as to 
limit liability, to avoid restrictions in the parent's charter or restrictions arising under law, for tax 
reasons and for purposes of avoiding complications arising from "foreign corporation" status; also 
citing non-legal reasons such as increasing the morale of the subsidiary's management, to settle 
shareholder disputes and public relations purposes); LARRY A. SODERQUIST & A.A. SOMMER, JR., 
UNDERSTANDING CORPORATE LAW 238-41 (1990) (citing use of subsidiaries in corporate acquisi­
tions); Sommer, supra note 100, at 259-73 (citing use as an effective method for controlling choice of 
law and venue). 
102. See Eric J. Gouvin, Shareholder Enforced Market Discipline: How Much is Too Much?, 16 
ANN. REV. BANKING L. 311, 312-17 (1997) [hereinafter Gouvin, Market Discipline] (providing a 
general overview of the moral hazard problem in the banking context). Of course, the moral hazard 
problem is not unique to the bank holding company situation. In fact, "moral hazard" may be present 
in any number of situations from products liability and workers' compensation to bankruptcy and 
health care. The idea of moral hazard is present in any situation where the existence of some kind of 
insurance or cost-shifting is perceived to reduce the incentives to reduce or minimize loss. See Tom 
Baker, On the Genealogy of Moral Hazard, 75 TEX. L. REV. 237, 238 (1996) (providing a history of 
the term "moral hazard" and criticizing its use in the debate over the reform of various government 
programs on the ground that the conditions necessary to give the concept force in economic theory do 
not exist in the real world). In general, a moral hazard results whenever one actor or class of actors in 
a transaction can undertake risky behavior without fear of loss because the loss from the risky activity 
falls on a different actor or group of actors by contract or other arrangement. See RICHARD A. 
POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 150 (3rd ed. 1986). Moral hazards are present in all 
transactions in which an actor may be shielded from liability by insurance or by limited liability 
business forms. See Frank H. Easterbrook and Daniel R. Fischel, Limited Liability and the 
Corporation, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 89, 103-04 (1985). All corporations entail some moral risk, for 
example, because the limited liability form always presents opportunities to shift losses from the 
equity holders to creditors and other claimants. See id. 
103. These regulatory mechanisms include, among other things: the so-called source of strength 
doctrine, 12 C.F.R. §225.4(a) (1996), cross guarantee provisions, 12 U.S.C. § 1815(e) (Supp. 1994), 
capital restoration plans, 12 U.S.C. § 183lo(e)(2)(C)(ii) (1996), regulatory agreements, the elaboration 
of a general fiduciary duty to regulators, equitable subordination, preferences, and fraudulent 
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The most powerful tool currently available to U.S. banking regulators 
to indirectly shift the costs of bank failure to holding companies is the 
cross-guarantee device contained in the Financial Institutions Reform, 
Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA). 104 The cross 
guarantee provisions allow the receiver of a failed insured bank to make 
claims against other commonly controlled insured depositary institutions 
for the loss that the receiver incurs or anticipates that it will incur in 
disposing of or assisting the failed institution. 105 This approach will not be 
useful in the international context because it only applies to insured 
depositary institutions. Assuming the cross guarantee provisions are not 
effective in the international context, and also assuming banking regula­
tors will still seek to protect the deposit insurance fund by looking for 
other parties to share the pain of bank failure, we may find the Federal 
Reserve Board resurrecting the "source of strength" doctrine. 
Under the source of strength doctrine, bank holding companies are 
required to assist bank subsidiaries in difficult financial times by providing 
financial assistance to them. 106 Although the validity of the source of 
strength is an open question, 107 the Federal Reserve Board continues to 
employ the source of strength idea in its decisions. 108 A return to the 
source of strength doctrine could mean that bank holding companies will 
essentially become unlimitedly liable for the losses that may occur when 
an insured bank fails. Obtaining these payments from foreign bank 
holding companies will also be problematic. Establishing the source of 
strength may be something that the Federal Reserve Board will seek to do 
through contractual arrangement at the time the foreign banking 
organization seeks to establish its U.S. operations, or perhaps through 
aggressive use of the "prompt corrective action" provisions of U.S. law. 109 
conveyances. See Gouvin, Market Discipline, supra note 102, at 333-45 (describing the various 
regulatory methods in light of a pervasive scheme to impose liability on holding companies). 
104. Pub. L. No. 101-73, 103 Stat. 183 (1989) (codified in various sections of 12 U.S.C. and 27 
U.S.C.). The cross guarantee provisions are codified at 12 U.S.C.A. § 1815(e) (West Supp. 1996). 
105. See id. 
106. See Policy Statement; Responsibility of Bank Holding Companies to Act as Sources of 
Strength to Their Subsidiary Banks, Federal Reserve System, 52 Fed. Reg. 15,707 (1987). 
I 07. For a brief discussion of the evolution of the source of strength doctrine and its current status, 
see Gouvin, Market Discipline, supra note 102, at 333-36; Leonard Bierman & Donald R. Fraser, The 
"Source of Strength" Doctrine: Formulating the Future of America's Financial Markets, 12 ANN. 
REV. BANKING L. 269 (1993). 
108. See, e.g., Deutsche Bank AG, 79 Fed. Res. Bull. 133, 137 (1993); Bane One Corp., 78 Fed. 
Res. Bull. !59, 161 (1992). · 
109. The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991 (FDICIA), Pub. L. No. 
102-242, 105 Stat. 2236, commonly referred to as FDICIA (codified as various sections of 12 U.S.C.), 
requires institutions defined as "undercapitalized" to submit a Capital Restoration Plan to the 
institution's federal banking agency. 12 U.S.C.A. § 183lo(e)(2)(D)(I)-(ii) (West Supp. 1996). If a 
bank holding company controls the financial institution, FDICIA prohibits the banking agency from 
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Under the prompt corrective action provisions, a troubled institution 
must submit a capital restoration plan to its regulator. If a troubled 
financial institution fails to submit a capital restoration plan or to 
implement a plan that has been submitted and approved, the regulators 
have a number of sanctions at their disposal, including the power to seize 
the institution_llo It should be noted, however, that no provision of U.S. 
banking law expressly requires a holding company to guarantee 
compliance with a subsidiary's Capital Restoration Plan. 1ll The optional 
aspect of these plans may have been designed to facilitate early resolution 
of the insured institutions by requiring the holding company to either 
make a financial commitment to the subsidiary's continued survival, or, 
alternatively to decline such a commitment and in doing so indicate to the 
regulators that the holding company is willing to let the subsidiary fail. 112 
Although the moral hazard problem is a serious public policy problem 
that should be addressed with innovative countermeasures, I have argued 
elsewhere that the current regulatory scheme goes too far in imposing 
liability on bank holding companies for bank failure, resulting in negative 
consequences. 113 I believe the move toward increased liability for bank 
holding companies is misplaced, and should be reassessed in order to give 
more respect to the separate legal existence of well capitalized banks and 
the holding companies that own them. Nevertheless, there are times when 
a holding company should bear some responsibility for the failure of its 
subsidiary. 114 The subsidiary arrangement makes the imposition of that 
liability somewhat problematic. 
2. Branching 
In general, from the point of view of the parent banking organization, 
branching should be more economically attractive than setting up an 
independent subsidiary since capital, accounting, and legal costs can be 
approving the Capital Restoration Plan unless the holding company guarantees compliance with the 
CRP for one year and provides adequate assurances of compliance. 12 U.S.C.A. § 
183lo(e)(2)(C)(ii)(D (West Supp. 1996). 
110. See 12 U.S.C. § 183lo(g)(3) (1994). 
Ill. See Cassandra Jones Havard, Back to the Parent: Holding Company Liability for Subsidiary 
Banks-A Discussion of the Net Wonh Maintenance Agreement, The Source ofStrength Doctrine, and 
the Prompt Corrective Action Provision, 16 CARDOZO L. REv. 2353, 2388 (1995). 
112. See Richard Scott Carnell, A Panial Antidote to Perverse Incentives: The FDIC Improvement 
Act of 1991, 12 ANN. REV. BANKING L. 317, 339 (1993). 
113. See Gouvin, Market Discipline, supra note 102, at 345-354. 
114. See Eric J. Gouvin, Horizontal Conflicts and Bank Holding Company Liability, 51-78 (Nov. 
12, 1997) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (arguing that holding companies should be 
liable to third parties for bank failure only to the extent the directors of the subsidiary owed a duty to 
non-shareholders (including the bank as an entity) and failed to carry out those duties). 
278 CONNECTICUT JOURNAL OF /NT'L LAW [Vol. 13:257 
shared more easily. 115 In the United States, operations would be more 
easily integrated because the prohibitions of §§23A and 23B will not 
apply to transactions between branches, but they would restrict 
transactions between commonly controlled subsidiaries. 116 In addition, 
loans generated by a branch can be made based on the capital of the home 
bank in the home country instead of on the branch's capital. On the other 
hand, liabilities of the branch will likely be imposed on the home office 
more readily than the obligations of a separately organized subsidiary 
would be. 117 Although local regulators are likely to have less control over 
a branch because the regulator in the home country will have primary 
responsibility, the branch is likely to be more stable because of the greater 
worldwide capital of the bank. 118 
3. Other Ways of Accessing Foreign Markets 
Another way to do business with a foreign country is through a 
"representative office" which does not solicit loans or take deposits, but 
which acts as a liaison to make it easier for potential borrowers or 
depositors in the host country to transact business with the foreign bank in 
the bank's home country. 119 In addition to these three common 
approaches, the United States permits banking activities to be carried out 
through "agencies" chartered by a state or the federal government, which 
are in effect special purpose banks. 120 
Finally, for some financial service providers, such as cash managers, 
mortgage servicers and data processors, it would appear that many aspects 
of international business may be undertaken from home. It seems likely 
that some aspects of the Mexican market, for instance, can be exploited 
115. See Zamora, Comments, supra note 6, at 79 (noting economies achieved through branching). 
116. See supra note 26 and accompanying text (describing§§ 23A and 23B). 
117. See Wells Fargo Asia, Ltd. v. Citibank, N.A., 936 F.2d 723 (2d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 505 
U.S. 1204 (1992) (holding that absent a contractual restriction on the place of collection, a customer of 
a foreign branch may recover from the bank's horne U.S. office the amount of the obligation). The 
risk of foreign sovereign actions that make meeting obligations impossible was addressed somewhat 
by amendments in 1994 to the Federal Reserve Act and the Federal Deposit Insurance Act, which 
changed the law to hold the horne U.S. offices liable for such obligations only if agreed in writing. 
See Palace, supra note 72, at !69 (describing the amendments). 
118. See Scott, supra note 94, at 491 (noting that local deposits of branch are backed by home 
office capital). 
119. See HAL S. SCOIT & PHILIP A. WELLONS, INTERNATIONAL FINANCE: TRANSACfiONS, 
POLICY, AND REGULATION 135 (4th ed. 1997). When Mexico was closed to foreign bank ownership, 
foreign banks were nevertheless permitted to maintain representative offices in the country. See 
Ghislain Gouraige, Jr., Recent Development, 24 HARv.INT'L L.J. 212,214 n.l9 (1983) (noting that at 
the time Mexico nationalized the Mexican banks there were over I 00 representative offices of foreign 
banks in Mexico). 
120. See Scorr & WELLONS, supra note 119, at 135. 
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from the United States without a physical presence in Mexico. 121 
Although for some companies, these alternative methods will make the 
most sense, this article focuses on the choice of subsidiaries as opposed to 
branches. 
On the question of whether subsidiaries or branches are preferable 
from a public policy point of view, corporate law would offer two possible 
insights: first, in order to avoid the moral hazard problem branches are 
preferable to subsidiaries because it is clearer that the home bank should 
be responsible for the branch's obligations; or, second, international 
banking law should permit both methods of expansion in order to let 
corporate planners exercise their own judgment about which form makes 
the most sense for a particular bank in a particular situation. 122 
B. Problems of Cross-Border Regulation 
Regulation is an inescapable fact of modem banking. Cross-border 
regulation, however, is awkward. Both the home and host countries have 
legitimate claims to full and accurate information on banks operating in or 
from their jurisdiction, 123 and both regulators have a legitimate concern to 
prevent the threat of systemic risk brought about by bank failure. 124 In an 
ideal world, bank regulators in different countries would be comfortable if 
they knew that a fellow regulator in another country was supervising the 
other aspects of an international bank's operations by applying rigorous 
standards. Such an ideal scheme would require at least two preconditions: 
(I) regulators would have to agree on acceptable standards that would pass 
international muster, and (2) regulators would have to have confidence in 
the competence and integrity of the regulators in other countries. 
Unfortunately, the NAFTA countries do not meet these conditions. It will 
121. Of course, large loans to major borrowers and government units can be arranged that way, but 
perhaps consumer banking services like credit cards can be offered in Mexico but serviced in the 
United States. See Karen MacAllister, Note, NAFTA: How the Banks in the United States and Mexico 
Will Respond, 17 Hous. J. INT'L L. 273, 295 (1994) (suggesting that credit cards, ATM networks and 
residential mortgages may be lucrative and easily penetrated market for U.S. banks desiring to do 
business with Mexico). 
122. This is the approach adopted by the NAFTA. NAFTA, supra note I, art. 1403(1}, 32 I.L.M. 
at 657 (recognizing the principle that investors should be able to choose the juridical form to use for 
cross-border banking). 
123. The lesson from the LDC debt crisis seems to be that more information is always preferable. 
See William A. Lovett, Conflicts in American Banking Regulation: Renewed Prudence, Retrenchment, 
and Struggles Over Growth Potential, 12 ANN. REv. BANKING L. 44, 49 (1993) (noting that there 
should be enforceable mutual disclosure laws so unsustainable debt loads do not get out of hand 
again). 
124. See generally Mico Loretan, Systemic Risk in Banking: Concept and Models, in REGULATION 
AND SUPERVISION OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS IN THE NAFTA COUNTRIES AND BEYOND 37, 38-42 
(George M. von Furstenberg ed., 1997) (discussing the concept of systemic risk generally). 
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be extraordinarily difficult for trade negotiators to make agreements about 
cross-border branching without also making a commitment to harmonize 
North American banking law. For example, the United States would 
legitimately want to know whether the source of strength doctrine would 
allow the Federal Reserve Board to pursue the holding companies of 
Mexican and Canadian banks operating in this country. Canada and 
Mexico would legitimately want to know whether Glass-Steagall will 
prohibit their banks from operating freely in the United States while also 
being part of an organization that owns a securities company. But the 
NAFfA does not contain any meaningful commitment to harmonization 
of the banking regulatory schemes of the three countries. 125 
On the second point, it is not at all clear that the regulators in the three 
countries have the mutual respect necessary for a successful cooperative 
regulation effort. For example, Canadians resent what they consider to be 
the propensity of U.S. regulators to seek extraterritorial application of U.S. 
law. 126 During the negotiation of the FfA and the NAFTA, it was 
understood that a significant part of Canada's opposition to cross-border 
branching was based on Canadian banking regulators' desire that there be 
a Canadian bank doing business in the country that they could regulate.127 
Similarly, there was some concern in the United States that the Mexican 
banking regulators were not up to the task of supervising a modern 
banking system. 
Given the lack of harmonization and the lack of mutual respect, it was 
inevitable that the NAFfA banking structure would default to a system 
requiring subsidiaries instead of one that permitted branching. Therefore, 
under current law, all three NAFfA countries permit expansion by 
establishment of subsidiaries, but only the United States permits foreign 
banks, including Canadian and Mexican banks, 128 to expand into our 
125. See Joel P. Trachtman, Trade in Financial Services Under GATS, NAFTA and the EC: A 
Regulatory Jurisdiction Analysis, 34 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 37, 94 (1995) (noting that the 
NAFfA does not require financial regulation harmonization). But see Stephen Zamora, NAFTA and 
the Hamwniwtion ofDomestic Legal Systems: The Side Effects of Free Trade, 12 ARIZ. J. OF INT'L & 
COMP. L. 401 (1995) [hereinafter Zamora, Harmonization] (arguing that increased cross-border 
contact between businesspeople, bureaucrats, lawyers, academics and others will inevitably lead to an 
exchange of ideas and accommodation in each of the three countries of the cultural differences of the 
others); Alfred C. Aman, Jr., A Global Perspective on Current Regulatory Reforms: Rejection, 
Relocation, or Reinvention?, 2 GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. J. 429 (1995) (arguing that global political and 
economic forces push national policies towards various forms of deregulation and privatization). 
126. See Jordan, supra note 3, at 48 (noting that "Canadian regulators do not indulge in the 
extraterritorial application of Canadian banking laws"). 
127. See id. (voicing the opinion that the Canadian trade negotiators did not yield to the pressures 
to permit U.S. branches because "Canadian regulators ... wished to ensure that there was a Canadian 
entity to be regulated."). 
128. In fact, branches are the most important mechanism for giving Canadian and Mexican banks 
access to the U.S. market. See Michael G. Martinson, Consolitklted Supervision of Cross-Border 
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market through branching. 129 The fact that the U.S. law permits 
branching, however, is not the end of the story. Foreign banks seeking to 
establish a presence in the United States must comply with a labyrinth of 
federal regulations which seem to treat foreign banks less favorably than 
U.S. banks. 130 The Foreign Bank Supervision Act of 1991 tightened U.S. 
supervision of foreign branches and agencies operating in the United 
States. 131 The law provides for increased sharing of information between 
home and host country regulators; mandates deposit insurance for all 
deposits under $1 00,000; requires the Federal Reserve to approve all 
applications for any branch, agency or representative office; and permits 
the Federal Reserve Board to examine and close all such international 
banking facilities. 132 
One of the most significant aspects of the new regulation is that 
foreign banks must decide if they intend to engage in wholesale or retail 
banking through their branches. If they plan to engage in retail banking, 
in which they will take deposits of less than $100,000, then the U.S. 
operation must be set up as an insured subsidiary rather than as a branch of 
the foreign bank. 133 The comprehensive supervision and information 
requirements of the law have dampened foreign interest in the U.S. 
banking market. 134 The increasingly difficult process of branching into the 
United States may explain the provision in the NAFT A that imposes a 
freeze on any further restrictions on cross-border banking. 135 
From a regulator's point of view, in a modern world where one 
banking organization might act across the country and around the world 
through dozens of wholly owned subsidiaries, the fiction of separate 
corporate personality for each subsidiary in a corporate group does not 
reflect reality. Because in the real world there is little practical difference 
Banking Activities: Principles and Practice in the NAFTA Context, in REGULATION AND SUPERVISION 
OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS IN THE NAFI'A COUNTRIES AND BEYOND 217, 225 (George M. von 
Furstenberg ed., 1997). 
129. Canada may soon propose legislation that would permit cross-border branching. See Weber, 
supra note 80. 
130. See Charles W. Hultman, Foreign Banks and the U.S. Regulatory Environment, 114 BANKING 
L.J. 452 (1997) (noting that the Foreign Bank Supervision Enhancement Act of 1991 resulted in less 
favorable treatment for foreign banks). 
131. See generally Daniel B. Gail et al., The Foreign Bank Supervision Act of /99/: "Expanding 
the Umbrella of Supervisory Regulation," 26 INT'L LAw. 993 (1992) (discussing changes in foreign 
bank supervision brought on by the BCCI scandal). 
132. See id. 
133. See 12 U.S.C. § 3105 (1994); Scott, supra note 94 (discussing the change from previous 
policy). 
134. See Hultman, supra note 130, at 453 (commenting that comprehensive supervision and 
extensive information requirements have contributed to waning foreign interest in the U.S. banking 
market). 
135. NAFI'A, supra note I, art. 1404(1), 32 I.L.M. at 658. 
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between a wholly owned subsidiary and a traditional branch, it seems 
overly formalistic that the legal treatment of one should differ from the 
other. 136 In order to accommodate complex corporate groups, 
international law will have to jettison traditional ideas about corporate 
personality, but when the corporate actors operate across national borders 
the challenge of harmonizing concepts of enterprise liability is a daunting 
137 one. 
If a workable solution to the moral hazard can be devised, and if 
home and host country regulators can coordinate their efforts in a mutually 
agreeable manner, there should be no real difference between a subsidiary 
and a branch, and financial services providers should be free to set up their 
corporate structures as they see fit. Therefore, if one were writing on a 
clean slate to devise the optimal North American legal framework for 
structuring the financial services industry one would probably enact a plan 
that permits the individual players in the market to determine the corporate 
structure they prefer, be it branching or holding company form. 
Unfortunately, the NAFTA negotiators are not writing on a clean slate. 
They have political, historical, and economic factors unique to their 
individual countries that they need to pay attention to. These factors make 
the public choice perspective on trade agreements a more useful tool for 
underst~ding the cross-border branching issue than the arguments based 
on the law of corporate groups. 
V. CROSS-BORDER BRANCHING: THE PUBLIC CHOICE PERSPECTIVE 
The traditional way of thinking about trade agreements is to assume 
that each trade negotiator will advocate for those results that are in his or 
her own country's best interest. By every negotiator doing so, they 
eventually reach an agreement that is informed by rational self-interest, 
but which may give rise to conflict upon implementation. 138 In the real 
world, however, it is misleading to suggest that nations have "interests." 
It is much more appropriate to recognize that to the extent a government 
136. See MELVIN A. EISENBERG, THE STRUCI"URE OF THE CORPORATION 303 (1976) (discussing 
that lack of a practical difference between wholly owned subsidiaries and traditional corporate 
divisions). For a traditional view of the rather inconsequential managerial aspects of the 
subsidiary/division distinction, see Robert W. Murphy, Corporate Divisions v. Subsidiaries, 34 HARv. 
Bus. REV. 83 (Nov.-Dec. 1956). 
137. See generally, PHILLIP I. BLUMBERG, THE MULTINATIONAL CHALLENGE TO CORPORATION 
LAW: THE SEARCH FOR A NEW CORPORATE PERSONALITY (1993) (describing the evolution of 
enterprise principles around the world and articulating a jurisprudence of corporate groups). 
138. See Enrico Colombatto & Jonathan R. Macey, A Public Choice Model of International 
Economic Cooperation and the Decline ofthe Nation State, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 925, 930-32 (1996) 
(describing the traditional view as "regime theory" in which negotiators seek to advance the interests 
of states). 
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takes a position it does so because competing interest groups within the 
nation have competed for, and won, government action. 139 The public 
choice140 perspective on international agreements suggests that countries 
will not agree to terms in a treaty unless the key interest groups in the 
country agree and the regulators who deal with the matter find it in their 
own best interests to do so. 141 
In light of the many demands of the constituents they represent, we 
would expect trade negotiators to make agreements that maximize their 
own interest groups' competitive positions, even if the theoretically 
optimal position would be somewhat different. Any attempt at regional 
integration will succeed only if the self-interests of key actors and interest 
groups within the region coincide. 142 In the case of the NAFT A, the 
interest groups concerned about cross-border financial services include, 
most obviously, the financial services providers of the member countries 
and the banking regulators who oversee those businesses. 
Each of the member nations has a different perspective on the 
attractiveness of cross-border branching, and we can reasonably expect the 
member countries not to sacrifice perceived advantages to their trading 
partners. Of course, it is difficult to negotiate multilateral trade 
agreements where the parties too vigorously pursue their own economic 
self-interest. While in a theoretical world they would all be better off 
under a system of completely free trade unencumbered by legal 
constructions, in the real world a prisoners' dilemma opens up by which 
cooperation and trust take a back seat to the pursuit of self-interest. 143 An 
139. See id. (examining the difference between regime theory and public choice theory). 
140. The scholars who make up the public choice camp are a somewhat loosely knit group. Their 
perspectives on the law draw heavily on economics, game theory, organizational behavior and political 
science. See generally DANIEL A FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PuBLIC CHOICE: A 
CRITICAL INTRODUCTION 21-33 (1991). See also Daniel A Farber & Philip P. Frickey, The 
Jurisprudence of Public Choice, 65 TEx. L. REV. 873, 878-79, 883, 901-06 (1987) (stating a general 
theory of "public choice" is impossible, since there are many variations on the set of core principles 
that have inspired many of the scholars); SHAUN H. HEAP ET AL., THE THEORY OF CHOICE: A 
CRITICAL GUIDE 209-15 ( 1992) (giving a useful overview of the topic, especially of the theoretical 
problems of aggregating preferences, which tends to make the output of collective bodies incoherent). 
141. See Colombatto & Macey, supra note 138, at 932 ("Public choice theory ... posits that 
international institutions are vehicles through which politicians, bureaucrats, and interest groups reflect 
their own interests."). 
142. See Frederick M. Abbott, Foundation-Building for Western Hemispheric Integration, 17 NW. 
J. INT'L L. & Bus. 900, 902 (1996-97) (discussing various interest groups, such as business groups, 
labor groups, environmental groups, citizen groups and government actors, whose interests would 
have to coincide in order to expand the NAFfA into the Free Trade Area of the Americas, and stating 
that "[t]he success of a regional integration effort may well depend on the presence of a sufficient 
confluence of self-interest among key actors and interest groups throughout economically-important 
countries in a region."). 
143. See Simser, supra note 5, at 40 (noting the propensity for states negotiating a trade pact to 
become subject to a prisoner's dilemma). 
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examination of the relative interests of the affected regulators and industry 
participants reveals that cross-border branching is a deadlocked issue. 
A. The Interest ofRegulators in the Status Quo 
One rent-seeking group infoiming the public choice perspective is the 
cadre of regulators who exercise authority over the various aspects of the 
financial services industry. In the United States, the picture is 
bewilderingly complex and includes state bank examiners, the FDIC, the 
Office of the Comptroller of Currency, the Office of Thrift Supervision, 
the Department of the Treasury, and the Federal Reserve Board who share 
a complicated and redundant regulatory scheme governing U.S. banks. 144 
Each of these government actors has some influence and control over the 
U.S. banking system and to a greater or lesser extent over foreign branches 
doing business in the United States. None of them will willingly give up 
their regulatory power without a good reason. Predictably, in the several 
occasions when Congress has considered reforming the banking regulatory 
scheme, the regulators have mobilized political opposition designed to 
protect the existing "turf' controlled by each agency. 145 
Canadian regulators fare no better on the turf protection front. Even 
though the domestic chain of command in Canada is clearer, on the 
international level Canadian regulators are not willing to give up their 
regulatory power without a fight. For example, it was understood during 
the negotiation of both the FTA and the NAFT A that Canada opposed 
cross-border branching in part due to the desire of the Canadian banking 
regulators that there be a Canadian bank doing business in the country that 
they could regulate. 146 We should expect Mexican regulators to behave 
like their American and Canadian counterparts. 
The observed turf war mentality is entirely consistent with a public 
choice view of the world, which sees regulators as managers who seek to 
maximize the value of their enterprises. 147 Because any scheme of cross­
144. See GAO Oversight Structure, supra note 12, at 36-56 (describing the redundant function of 
the federal banking regulators). 
145. See Coffee, supra note 41 (describing the recurrent turf battles); see also Edward J. Kane, The 
Evolving U.S. Legislative Agenda in Banking and Finance, in REGULATION AND SUPERVISION OF 
FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS IN THE NAFTA COUNTRIES AND BEYOND 186-88 (George M. von 
Furstenberg ed., 1997) [hereinafter Kane, Legislative Agenda] (describing one round in the on-going 
battle between the Fed and the OCC over the structure of bank activities). 
146. See Jordan, supra note 3, at 48 (voicing the opinion that the Canadian trade negotiators did 
not yield to the pressures to permit U.S. branches because "Canadian regulators ... wished to ensure 
that there was a Canadian entity to be regulated."). 
147. See Edward J. Kane, Tension Between Competition and Coordination in International 
Financial Regulation, in GoVERNING BANKING'S FuTURE: MARKETS VS. REGULATION 33, 34 
(Catherine England ed., 1991) [hereinafter Kane, Tension] (describing the need of regulators to 
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border branching that makes sense for the NAFfA member countries will 
necessarily require paring away some of the current regulatory load, the 
existing regulators who have a vested interest in the current system will 
not give up their authority willingly. 
The banking regulators of the three countries can be expected to 
defend their turf. The NAFfA is based primarily on the idea of host 
country regulation. If the treaty leads to greater harmonization, the 
members may consider a European style home country regulatory 
approach. 148 The home country approach would probably be acceptable to 
U.S. and Canadian regulators since banks from their countries are likely to 
have the most extensive North American operations. Until that time, 
however, the first impulse of the regulators will be to jealously stake out 
their territory. 
On the other hand, there is a dynamic tension between the regulators 
and the regulated that makes regulators sensitive to industry concerns. 
The costs of regulation can be quite high, and banking firms to some 
extent prefer to choose the regulator they will be covered by. Corporate 
structure allows banking organizations some leeway in selecting their 
regulators. Subsidiaries are regulated primarily in the jurisdiction in 
which they are chartered. The regulation of branches is more complicated: 
for prudential matters, such as capital levels and management competence, 
the home country regulator has priority, but for market matters, the host 
country regulates. Because different countries govern different aspects of 
international banking organizations and because regulators act to increase 
their jurisdiction, regulators may act as catalysts to change banking 
regulation in order to attract more regulatees to their jurisdiction. By 
acting to attract banking firms, international regulators compete with one 
another for "market share." 149 By attracting firms from other countries, 
regulators can increase their power and the value of their regulatory 
enterprise. 
In the NAFfA countries, regulatory competition seems to favor 
Canada and Mexico over the United States. Banks in both of those 
countries are freer to engage in a wider range of activities over a wider 
geographic area with less bureaucratic interference than are banks 
chartered in the United States. In light of this, U.S. regulators may 
recognize their competitive disadvantage and may wish to delay cross-
maximize the value of their enterprise within the confines of something he calls the "microeconomic 
analysis of financial regulation," which is consistent with the public choice view). 
148. See WHITE, supra note 3, at 18 (discussing the home country versus the host country 
approach to regulation). 
149. See Kane, Tension, supra, note 147, at 35 (noting that banking regulators must be aware of 
competition from banking regulators in other countries). 
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border branching until the U.S. regulatory scheme can be made more 
compatible with international norms. 
B. Interests ofthe Financial Services Industry in the Status Quo 
Of course, the structure of the banking industry is not driven solely by 
the actions of regulators. The market participants in the financial services 
industry also influence the way in which the North American market is 
structured. Frequently, the industry's desires must be translated into 
political action before they bear fruit. In Mexico and Canada, the financial 
services sector is relatively concentrated. The key players in those 
countries may be able to mobilize political power to press for their 
positions. In the United States, however, the financial services industry is 
balkanized. I have already discussed the Glass-Steagall distinction 
between commercial and investment banking, but the industry also 
includes the insurance industry, thrifts, credit unions, finance companies 
and other non-banks engaged in the financial services sector. Even within 
the banking industry there are separate camps of common interest ranging 
from the money center banks, to the regional banks, to the community 
banks. Each of these participants has its own perspective on the wisdom 
of financial services modernization, and to date no one group or coalition 
of groups has mobilized enough political support to change the structure 
of the financial services industry in the United States.150 Nevertheless, 
there are some observations that can be made about the three countries on 
the cross-border branching issue. 
1. The United States 
Ironically, though the United States has been a leading proponent of 
extending formal international trade agreements to cover trade in 
services, 151 it seems unlikely that the United States will lead the charge to 
150. See Howard Gleckman & Dean Foust, Why Congress Can't Afford to Shatter G/ass-Steagall, 
Bus. WK., Mar. 30, 1998, at 38 (commenting that financial services modernization comes up in 
Congress about every two years, just in time for massive fundraising from affected industries and 
drawing the conclusion that Congress will never change the status quo because it needs the biennial 
source of campaign funds). 
151. See Simser, supra note 5, at 44-45 (noting that the United States pushed to expand GATT 
during the Tokyo round to include trade in services, but the idea turned out to be quite contentious 
because: (I) trade in services was already being addressed by the United Nations Conference on Trade 
and Development (UNCTAD); (2) developing countries feared that existing open issues in GATT such 
as agriculture and textiles would be linked to concession on trade in services; (3) developing countries 
feared any negotiated regime would merely be a way for developed countries to perpetuate their 
dominance in the services sector; and (4) the proposals did not deal with the full range of services very 
well, but instead focused on capital and technology intensive services and paid scant attention to labor­
intensive services). 
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bring cross-border branching to the NAFfA countries. The current 
structure of cross-border banking via subsidiaries serves U.S. banks very 
well. The United States has access to both Canada and Mexico on better 
terms than the rest of the world's major banking powers, while Canada 
and Mexico have access to the United States on essentially the same terms 
as every other country. 
Now that U.S. law permits nationwide branching, U.S. banks should 
be very reluctant to permit our North American neighbors unfettered 
access to our national market, § 1403 of the NAFfA notwithstanding. 
American banks need time to establish their own nationwide branching 
systems and should not permit our trade representatives to allow Canadian 
and Mexican banks to get in on the ground floor of U.S. nationwide 
branching. On their home territories both Mexican and Canadian banks 
have long established national branch networks that give them a big head 
start on any U.S. attempts to enter their respective markets. Besides, there 
is significant evidence suggesting that foreign banks in the United States 
are less profitable that their U.S. competitors. 152 Because a branch 
network should be cheaper and therefore more profitable than a subsidiary 
network, permitting true branches will only serve to make foreign banks 
more competitive in the United States. The banking lobby will use its 
political clout to prevent that from occurring. 
2. Canada 
The banking provisions of the NAFTA, as currently written, make 
very little difference in the Canadian banking market. As a practical 
matter, the Schedule I banks will never be taken over by foreign interests 
as long as the "widely held" rule remains in place. 153 In any event, the 
Canadian market is already over-banked. The major Canadian banks 
dominate the Canadian market and have come to recognize that 
opportunities for growth are outside Canada. 154 For American and 
Mexican banks, the NAFTA's relatively benign provisions allow slightly 
easier access to a mature market where well-established firms have long 
customer relationships and efficient operations. 155 
152. See Hultman, supra note 130, at 453 (providing statistics showing that the average return on 
assets of foreign banks operating in the United States is significantly lower than that of U.S. banks 
generally and lower than a cohort group of internationally active U.S. banks); Scon & WELLONS, 
supra note 119, at 138 (noting that foreign banks appear to be less efficient and more dependent on 
wholesale funding, thereby making their cost of funds higher). 
153. See Bank Act, R.S.C., ch. B-1.01, § 370(2) (1996) (Can.) (defining "widely held"). 
154. See Weber, supra note 80 (noting that Canadian banks are looking south for growth). 
155. See James R. Kraus, Canada Plan Would Permit Cross-Border Branches, AM. BANKER, May 
22, 1997, at 22 (quoting Canadian banking experts who remark that Canada has a technology and cost 
efficiency edge on U.S. banks resulting in lower spreads and the need for high volume to cover costs). 
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Foreign financial service providers have found it very difficult to 
establish profitable operations in Canada. 156 Although many U.S. banks 
maintain a presence in Canada, it is clear they will never be major players 
there. 157 Therefore, Canadian banking interests probably do not care 
whether the NAFTA member countries are permitted to branch into 
Canada, as long as the other markets, especially Mexico, are opened to 
Canadian banks in return. 
3. Mexico 
Mexico represents a very attractive market for U.S. and Canadian 
banks. 158 While the markets in the United States and Canada are fairly 
well saturated with banking services, Mexico is dramatically under 
banked. 159 With the average interest rate on a Mexican loan at 32%, 160 
U.S. banks have been eyeing the potential of the Mexican banking market 
for some time. 161 The easiest way for the United States and Canada to get 
access to Mexico would be for the NAFT A to provide unfettered, routine 
cross-border branching, but based on how events have unfolded since the 
enactment of the NAFT A, it is unlikely to receive support from the big 
U.S. banks. 
Branching will only be a minor issue for the U.S. banks already 
present in Mexico. The large U.S. and Canadian banks have already 
expanded into Mexico through the subsidiary device. 162 Even in a world 
156. See WHITE, supra note 3, at 10 (noting that foreign banks in Canada have failed to achieve 
rates of return on equity that even equal the return available from Canadian treasury bills). 
!57. See id. (noting that Canada has been a "tough nut to crack" for U.S. banks and pointing out 
that in the seventeen years since U.S. banks have been permitted in Canada they have a very limited 
presence, with Citicorp, the largest, having merely $4.8 billion in assets, which amounts to about one 
half of one percent of total Canadian banking assets). 
158. See Zamora, Comments, supra note 6, at 78 (noting attractiveness of Mexican banking 
market). 
159. See Jordan, supra note 3, at 52 n.43 (noting that at the time of the NAFTA's negotiation only 
8% of Mexicans had a checking account and there were an average of 18,500 people per banking 
branch in Mexico as opposed to approximately 2,000 people per branch in the United States and 
Canada); see also WHITE, supra note 3, at 16 (giving the branching information as 19,000 people per 
branch in Mexico versus 2,000 people per branch in the United States and Canada); MacAllister, supra 
note 121, at 297 (noting that Mexico is a large, untapped market). 
160. See Davis, supra note 56, at 101 (noting the high Mexican interest rate compared to similar 
U.S. loans). 
161. See Karen Epper, Crowded at Home, U.S. Firms Look to Mexico, AM. BANKER, Jan. 19, 
1994, at II. With rates of return on equity in Mexican banks at 27% compared to 13% for U.S. banks 
and I 0% for Canadian banks, the Mexican banking industry seems to show signs of weak competition. 
See WHITE, supra note 3, at 16 (providing return on equity figures). 
162. See Drew Clark, Harris Marketers Look to a Mouse That Roars, AM. BANKER, Jan. 7, 1998, 
at 14 (describing Bank of Montreal's plan to be the first true North American bank through its 
operations in Canada, Mexico and the United States); James R. Kraus, Commercia Near Decision on 
Opening Bank in Canada, AM. BANKER, July 2, 1997, at 5 (describing Commercia's North American 
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where branches were permitted in Mexico, a banking organization might 
decide to expand through a subsidiary to control liability exposure, 
especially political risk. Because they have already incurred the expense 
and inconvenience of establishing Mexican subsidiaries, 163 it strikes me as 
improbable that U.S. banks will become champions of unfettered 
branching which would permit late-comers to expand into Mexico at a 
lower cost. 
There is tremendous room for growth in the Mexican banking 
market. 164 Over time the newly created foreign subsidiaries may take a 
leadership role in the market. Even with American and other foreign 
competition, however, existing Mexican banks have an edge because of 
their extensive branch networks (which gives them a diverse geographic 
and customer base), solid capital structure, knowledge of their market, 
knowledge of the Mexican legal system, and political connections.165 
Even with all these advantages, Mexico has legal protections in place to 
prevent its banking system from falling into foreign hands. 
Perhaps aware that its banking market was ripe for picking under the 
NAFTA, Mexico has reserved a degree of state-supported protection for 
its banking industry during a six-year period following the enactment of 
the treaty. After the transition period however, foreign investors will be 
limited to acquiring institutions that control less than four percent of the 
strategy); Fluckiger, supra note 60, at 82 (describing the Mexican operations of Bank of Nova Scotia, 
Bank of Montreal, Wells Fargo, and NationsBank); Weber, supra note 80 (noting that Canadian 
bankers are looking south for growth). 
163. See Palace, supra note 72, at 162 (describing the flurry of application approved by U.S. 
banking organizations to engage in a range of activities in Mexico). 
164. Somewhat surprisingly, given that the United States has had relatively easy access to the 
Canadian market for a much longer time than it has been able to do business freely in Mexico, total 
U.S. bank exposure to the two countries is almost equal. See FED. FIN. INST. EXAM. COUNCIL 
STATISTICAL RELEASE, Jan. 14, 1998, at 1-2 (showing total exposure of all reporting banks to Canada 
to be $21.302 billion and to Mexico to be $17.978 billion; of that amount exposure by money center 
banks-defined as Bank of America, Bankers Trust, Chase Manhattan, Citicorp, First Chicago and J.P. 
Morgan-was $12.743 billion to Canada and $14.385 billion to Mexico, id. at 17-18; other large 
banks-defined as BankBoston Corp., Bank of New York Co., Corestates Financial Corp., First Union 
Corp., Nationsbank Corp., Republic NY Corp., and State Street Corp.-had exposure of $6.354 billion 
to Canada and $1.227 billion to Mexico, id. at 33-34; finally, all other reporting banks had exposure of 
$2.205 billion to Canada and $2.366 billion to Mexico). These numbers perhaps reflect the relative 
size of the Mexican and Canadian economies. Using 1993 conversion rates, Canada's GNP was 8.7% 
of the U.S. GNP, while using 1992 conversion rates Mexican GNP was 5.5% of U.S. GNP. See 
WHITE, supra note 3, at I n.l (providing figures). The different growth rates of the two economies 
may have produced a different result in 1997. 
165. See Thomas Heather, Comments on Financial Services, Other Services, and Temporary Entry 
Rules, I U.S.-MEXICO L.J. 73, 75 (1993) (listing advantages held by Mexican firms in the post­
NAFTA Mexican banking market); MacAllister, supra note 121, at 303-04 (noting many potential 
competitive advantages of Mexican banks in the retail and commercial banking markets, including the 
ability of customers of Mexican banks to pay their utility bills at the bank). 
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capital in the banking system. 166 This limitation should effectively place 
the most important Mexican banks beyond the reach of any foreign 
acquirer. So Mexico, like Canada, has essentially protected its leading 
banking firms from foreign takeover. 
While Mexico has obtained a degree of protection at home, they may 
also desire to cross the border into the southern tier of the United States to 
provide banking services to the substantial Hispanic populations in those 
states. 167 Mexican banks were already doing business in the southwestern 
United States, primarily through subsidiaries, prior to the enactment of the 
NAFfA. 168 Mexican banks would probably prefer to service that market 
through a branch network; therefore, depending on how attractive the U.S. 
market is deemed to be, the Mexican negotiators may be willing to make 
some concessions on branching. 
C. 	 Specific Aspects of Comparative Advantage Among the NAFTA 
Countries 
In addition to the general considerations discussed above, several 
specific aspects of comparative advantage in the three countries deserve 
attention: the safety net subsidy, economies of scope, and economies of 
scale. This section discusses those items and ends with a brief overview 
of some other comparative advantage matters that may be significant for 
further NAFfA negotiations. 
1. 	 The Safety Net Subsidy Question 
A matter that could weigh heavily in deciding whether branching is to 
be preferred to expansion by subsidiary is whether U.S. banks enjoy a 
subsidy from the federal government. 169 If our banks do receive such a 
subsidy, and existing firewalls make it difficult to pass the benefit of the 
subsidy upstream to the holding company, banks should be clamoring for 
branching rights since that would permit them to exploit the benefit of the 
subsidy in addition to all the other benefits of branching. 
166. 	 See NAFfA, supra note I, Annex VII(B)(13), 32 I.L.M. at 775. 
167. See Davis, supra note 56, at 99 (noting that Mexican banks are especially interested in 
cultivating the southwestern border region of the United States). But see Andrea Gerlini, In This 
Texas Town, Their Favorite Bank is Mattress Savings, WALL ST. J., Oct. 31, 1996, at AI (noting 
market research showing that Hispanics are reluctant to use banking services). 
168. See Cogan, supra note 57, at 770 (noting the presence of Mexican banking subsidiaries in the 
United States since 1978). 
169. See David G. Oedel, Puzzling Banking Law: Its Effects and Purposes, 67 U. Cow. L. REv. 
477, 479 (1996) ("banking law enshrines fundamental economic inefficiencies in banking that are 
tolerable for banks because of breathtaking anti-competitive protections and financial subsidies­
protections and subsidies that are not always apparent to outsiders nor admitted publicly by banking 
savants."). 
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The Federal Reserve Board clearly believes that the federal banking 
safety net provides the U.S. banking industry with a subsidy vis-a-vis 
other financial services providers. 170 Although Chairman Greenspan sees 
the creation of a subsidy to banking as an "undesirable but unavoidable 
consequence of creating a safety net," 171 he believes that the subsidy 
should be contained within the bank to the extent possible in order to 
prevent the transfer of the sovereign credit subsidy for non-banking 
purposes which might result in a "subsidized competitive advantage" to 
the bank affiliate. 172 
Others, most notably the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, 
question whether a net subsidy to the U.S. banking industry exists. 173 Of 
course, bankers do not believe they receive a subsidy - pointing to the 
deposit insurance premiums, capital requirements, and regulatory costs as 
evidence that they pay for whatever benefit they receive from the safety 
net. 174 Officials from the FDIC and the Department of Treasury have also 
170. See generally Myron L. Kwast & S. Wayne Passmore, Board of Governors of the Federal 
Reserve System, The Subsidy Provided by the Federal Safety Net: Theory, Measurement and 
Containment (1997) (articulating a theory that the government's commitment to the prevention of a 
systematic banking crisis provides a subsidy to banks). See also Statement of Alan Greenspan, 
Chairman, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Before the Subcommittee on Financial 
Institutions and Consumer Credit of the Committee on Banking and Financial Services, U.S. House of 
Representatives, Feb. 13, 1997, reprinted in 83 Fed. Res. Bull. 249 (Apr. 1997) [hereinafter Greenspan 
Statement] (stating "In this century the Congress has delegated the use of sovereign credit-the power 
to create money and borrow unlimited funds at the lowest possible rate-to support the banking 
system. It has done so indirectly as a consequence of deposit insurance, Federal Reserve discount 
window access, and final riskless payment system transactions ... [As a result of the government's 
major role in protecting the banking system, banks get an unfair advantage over other financial 
services providers because banks] determine the level of risk-taking and receive gains therefrom, but 
do not bear the full costs of that risk. The remainder of the risk is transferred to the government."). 
171. Greenspan Statement, supra note 170, at 250. 
172. /d. 
173. See GARY WHALEN, OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, THE COMPETITIVE 
IMPLICATIONS OF SAFETY NET-RELATED SUBSIDIES (1997) (examining the existing empirical 
evidence addressing the subsidy question and concluding that even if some evidence points to a small 
gross subsidy, it cannot be taken at face value because the studies fail to take the costs of regulation 
into account). 
174. See Janet Seiberg, Banks' Plea To Fed: Stop Saying We're Subsidized, AM. BANKER, Nov. 5, 
1997, at I (noting the banking industry's arguments). The Fed's subsidies generated a flurry of 
pointed comments in AMERICAN BANKER, the newspaper of record for the U.S. banking industry. See 
Bert Ely, Comment: Greenspan's Deposit Insurance Subsidy Argument Is Nonsense, AM. BANKER, 
June 6, 1997, at 3 (stating that deposit insurance has never cost taxpayers a cent, loans from the 
discount window must be collateralized and the small risk of intraday overdraft risk can be minimized 
by proper management and concluding there is no meaningful subsidy); Warren G. Heller, To The 
Editor: It Sure Looks Like a Subsidy to Me, AM. BANKER, June 17, 1997, at 7 (arguing that if one 
considers the historical support of the banking system, there is a net subsidy); Bert Ely, Letter to the 
Editor: Congress Has Largely Ended Deposit Insurance Subsidy, AM. BANKER, July 2, 1997, at 9 
(responding to criticism and noting that historical problems have been remedied by congressional 
action). 
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raised questions about the existence of a subsidy, especially in light of 
. 175 regu1at10n costs. 
While the debate over the existence and extent of the safety net 
subsidy in the context of domestic banking policy drags on, the issue has a 
different dimension in the international context. Intuitively, U.S. bankers 
would, if such a subsidy exists, insist on engaging in cross-border 
branching as soon as possible so that the U.S. banks could exploit the 
subsidy in our neighboring countries. But in the international setting, such 
an argument is off the mark because all important banking countries 
bestow some kind of systemic default guarantee that acts to protect 
depositors and subsidize banks. 176 The mere existence of such a subsidy 
does not explain one country's competitive success in the banking market 
vis-a-vis banks from other countries, but rather success is more likely 
determined by a combination of "comparative advantage, the 
fundamentals of each economy, and governmental support in the form of 
safety net policies." 177 So while the safety net subsidy is part of the 
picture, it is only part. On the international level the important question to 
ask in not "does a subsidy exist", but rather "how big is one subsidy 
compared to the subsidies provided by the other countries?" 
It appears from the available evidence, for example, that the safety net 
subsidy enjoyed by European and Japanese banks is greater than the 
subsidy bestowed upon U.S. banks. 178 Canada's banks enjoy safety-net 
benefits from their deposit insurance system and central bank similar to 
the benefits bestowed upon U.S. banks by the FDIC and the Fed. 179 One 
might surmise from the difference in the regulatory burden between the 
United States and Canada that the net subsidy to Canadian banks exceeds 
175. See Olaf de Senerpont Domis, Helfer, Ludwig Insist Deposit Insurance Doesn't Give Banks 
an Unfair Advantage, AM. BANKER, Mar. 6, 1997, at 2 (recounting the testimony of Comptroller of 
the Currency Eugene Ludwig and Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Chairman Ricki Helfer that 
the Fed's subsidy argument is incorrect because it does not take regulatory compliance costs into 
account); Remarks of John D. Hawke, Jr., Under Secretary of the Treasury for Domestic Finance, 
AALS Annual Meeting, San Francisco, Jan. 8, 1998, Panel Discussion on What is the Governmental 
Role in Finance, Anyway?, 3 (manuscript on file with author) (expressing skepticism of the existence 
of a net subsidy). 
176. See Colombatto & Macey, supra note 138, at 941. 
177. HAL S. SCOTI & SHINSAKU IWAHARA, IN SEARCH OF A LEVEL PLAYING FIELD: THE 
IMPLEMENTATJONOFTHEBASLE CAPITAL ACCORD IN JAPAN AND THE UNITED STATES 1 (1994). 
178. See Hal S. Scott, The Competitive Implications of the Basle Capital Accord, 39 ST. LoUIS 
U. L.J. 885, 887 (1995) (noting the relative stability of European and Japanese banks generally 
compared to U.S. banks and noting that creditors will demand higher interest rates from United States 
banks because the overall risk of lending to United States banks is higher). 
179. See Reforms Needed for Financial Services to Flourish Says CBA, CANADA NEWS WIRE, Oct. 
29, 1997 (reporting on Canadian Bankers Association report that urges reevaluation of the "special 
privileges" accorded to Canadian banks, such as deposit insurance, liquidity support from the Bank of 
Canada, and access to the payment system). 
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the U.S. subsidy. As to Mexican banks, the overall quality of the 
country's commitment to its banking system, although recently tested by 
the peso crisis, probably does not translate into a very big subsidy for 
Mexican banks (especially with the memory of nationalization still 
relatively fresh in the collective consciousness of the industry). On the 
matter of safety net subsidy, therefore, Canada would appear to have the 
edge and would therefore desire to branch directly across national borders 
to capitalize on the subsidy. American and Mexican banks would be 
expected to resist. 
2. Economies of Scope 
An economy of scope occurs when it is cheaper for one firm to 
produce two products together than it would be for two separate firms to 
produce the separate products independently. 180 The artificial 
compartmentalization of the U.S. financial services market effectively 
prevents banking organizations from realizing meaningful economies of 
scope. Studies examining the issue have found that there is no consistent 
evidence of global economies of scope in banking, although there is some 
evidence of product specific economies of scope in production.181 The 
lack of academic literature supporting the existence of economies of scope 
in banking has been offered as an argument against breaking down the 
artificial barriers that define U.S. commercial banking. 182 
The weakness of the literature, however, is that is focuses on the 
banking industry as it currently exists. If the barriers between commercial 
and investment banking were eliminated, many observers of the banking 
business believe economies of scope would be significant. 183 Therefore, 
180. See Loretta J. Mester, Efficient Production of Financial Services: Scale and Scope of 
Economies, FED. RESERVE BANK OF PHILA. BUS. REV. 15, 15-16 (Jan./Feb. 1987). 
181. See Jeffery A. Clark, Economies of Scale and Scope at Depositary Financial Institutions: A 
Review of the Literature, 73 FED. RESERVE BANK KAN. CITY EcoN. REV. 16, 26 (Sept./Oct. 1988) 
(reviewing the literature and finding little evidence of meaningful overall economies of scope, but 
finding support for the idea that there may exist cost complementarity for some pairs of products); see 
also William Curt Hunter & Stephen G. Timme, Does Multi-product Production in l.Llrge Banks 
Reduce Costs?, 74 ECON. REV. FED. RESERVE BANK ATLANTA 2 (May/June 1989) (finding that multi­
product production does not necessarily result in lower costs of production). 
182. See Leach Circulates GAO Study Criticizing Mixing of Banking and Commerce, 16 No. 7 
BANKING PoL'Y REP. 10, 12 (Apr. 1997) (quoting House Republican Conference Chair John Boehner 
(R-Ohio) stating "the virtually unanimous finding in the literature is that economies of scope are 
insignificant in banking"). 
183. See David M. Eaton, The Commercial Banking-Related Activities of Investment Banks and 
Other Nonbanks, 44 EMORY L.J. 1187, 1206 n.127 (1995) (citing ROBERT E. LITAN, WHAT SHOULD 
BA>'IKS Do? 60 (1987) for the proposition that combining financial products will result in economies 
of scope); Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Corporate Governance and Commercial 
Banking: A Comparative Examination ofGermany, Japan and the United States, 48 STAN. L. REV. 73, 
110 (1995) (noting economies of scope between banks and their securities affiliates); Joseph J. Norton 
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the ability of U.S. banks to achieve meaningful economies of scope likely 
depends on repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act. This, in turn, will be a 
multifaceted U.S. domestic political question. Glass-Steagall has 
essentially provided the U.S. securities industry with a generous subsidy 
and the industry is unlikely to give up the advantages of the law without a 
fight.l84 
To the extent U.S. banks are unable to exploit economies of scope, 
they are at a competitive disadvantage to their Canadian and Mexican 
competitors. At the anecdotal level, since Canada has permitted banks to 
acquire securities dealers as subsidiaries, all of the major Canadian 
securities dealers are now owned by banks. 185 Although cause and effect 
are difficult to prove, all three U.S. brokerage firms with a presence m 
Canada in 1987 had withdrawn from the market by 1994. 186 
3. Economies of Scale 
When a firm can increase its level of output and experience a decline 
in the average cost of production, economies of scale exist, since it costs 
proportionately less to produce at a larger scale. 187 Although researchers 
have long studied the existence of economies of scale in the banking 
industry, results of those studies do not paint a clear picture. 188 Although 
not all of the studies make the distinction explicitly, some studies have 
examined the question of whether overall economies of scale exist in the 
& Christopher D. Olive, The Ongoing Process of International Bank Regulatory and Supervisory 
Convergence: A New Regulatory-Market "Pannership," 16 ANN. REV. BANKING L. 227, 276 n.l70 
(1997) (explaining that economies of scope could arise in combining commercial and investment 
banking because information gathering function is an important part of both businesses); George A 
Walker, The Law of Financial Conglomerates: The Next Generation, 30 INT'L LAW. 57, 63 (1996) 
(noting that one advantage of conglomeration is the presence of economies of scope). 
184. See Donna L. Lance, Note, Can the Glass-Steagall Act be Justified Under the Global Free 
Trade Market Policies of the NAFTA?, 34 WASHBURN L.J. 297, 298 (1995) (observing that Glass­
Steagall has shielded the U.S. securities industry from domestic competition from commercial banks 
and thereby bestowed a subsidy to the securities industry). 
185. See WHITE, supra note 3, at I 0. 
186. See id. 
187. See Mester, supra note 180. 
188. The earliest empirical studies of economies of scale tended to show that scale economies in 
banking were relatively unimportant. See Richard W. Nelson, Economies of Scale v. Regulation as 
Determinants of U.S. Banking Structure, in PROCEEDINGS OF A CONFERENCE ON BANK STRUCTURE 
AND COMPETITION 462 (1983). Studies during the 1960s, however, found significant economies of 
scale in the banking industry. See FREDERICK W. BELL & NEIL B. MURPHY, ECONOMIES OF SCALE IN 
COMMERCIAL BANKING 8, 8-9 (1967) (analyzing data obtained in 1965, showed that unit costs 
declined significantly as banks expanded operations); George J. Benston Economies of Scale and 
Marginal Costs in Banking Operations 2 NAT'L BANKING REV. 507, 541 (June 1965) (using data from 
the early 1960s concluded that economies of scale were observed in each of several different banking 
services analyzed). 
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industry, while other studies have examined whether product-specific 
economies of scale exist189 
Studies in the 1970s and 1980s, evaluating the existence of overall 
economies of scale in the banking industry, almost unanimously 
concluded that economies of scale either did not exist or were exhausted 
for the most part by the time banks had accumulated assets ranging from 
$25 million to $100 million. 190 Because of problems in the methodology 
and data, 191 however, it is probably safe to say that the final word on 
overall economies of scale has not yet been written, especially since 
studies at the product-specific level have reached significantly different 
conclusions. 
While studies during the 1970s and 1980s consistently concluded that 
overall economies of scale in the banking industry either do not exist or 
disappear after relatively low output levels, other studies prepared during 
the period have tended to show that some product-specific economies of 
scale do exist. 192 Intuitively, it seems obvious that economies of scale, at 
least on the product-specific level, should exist in banking. As an 
example, in order to produce consumer loans, banks must invest in a 
certain amount of legal work, form preparation, training, record keeping, 
189. The difference appears to be crucial. Because banks are multi-product firms, the cost 
structure can be analyzed either as a function of the entire product mix or as a function of each 
individual product. Only recently have economists developed the mathematical tools to meaningfully 
explore overall economies of scale in a multi-product firm as a function of the entire product mix. 
190. See Clark, supra note 181, at 26 (noting 13 empirical studies finding that overall economies 
of scale appear to exist only at low levels of output, while diseconomies of scale appear at large output 
levels); George J. Benston et a!., Economies of Scale and Scope in Banking, in PROCEEDINGS OF A 
CONFERENCE ON BANK STRUCfURE AND COMPETITION 432, 452 (1983) (concluding that there are no 
overall scales of economy below low output levels); see also A. Sinan Cebenoyan, Multi-Product Cost 
Functions and Scale Economies in Banking, 23 FIN. REV. 499 (Nov. 1988); Thomas Gilligan & 
Michael Smirlock, An Empirical Study of Joint Production and Scale Economies in Commercial 
Banking, 8 J. BANKING & FIN. 67, 67-77 (1984) (finding scale economies in small banks, but 
diseconomies in large banks). 
191. The conclusions of the studies are subject to the following caveats: a) they all relied on an 
evaluative technique known as the translog cost function, but that function may contain deficiencies 
causing it to invariably find a U-shaped cost curve, see James E. McNulty, Economies of Scale: 
Discussion, in PROCEEDINGS OF A CONFERENCE ON BANK STRUCTURE AND COMPETITION 456, 457 
(1983); b) the data sample analyzed by various researchers came from the Federal Reserve's 
functional cost analysis system (FCA), which consists of only approximately 700-800 banks, is not a 
random sample, is a voluntary reporting scheme and likely contains information from a 
disproportionate number of banks that are concerned about their costs for some reason or another, id.; 
c) the studies do not include banks with over a billion dollars in assets, see e.g. Benston et a!., 
Economies ofScale and Scope in Banking, supra note 190, at 433. Very large banks could display the 
kinds of scale economies that would challenge the existing findings. In today' s market, a billion dollar 
bank is not all that large. This is a serious shortcoming in the data. 
192. See Peter Maloney, Merging Trust Operations, 98 U.S. BANKER, June I, 1989, at 37-38 
(finding that banks can capitalize on significant economies of scale by combining trust departments in 
one operational unit); John P. Mara, The New Economics of Mortgaging, 49 MORTGAGE BANKING, 
Mar. 1989, at 89-94 (reporting that evidence suggests technologically induced economies of scale exist 
in mortgage banking and servicing and do not diminish until volumes reached about $2.5 billion). 
296 CONNECTICUT JOURNAL OF INT'LLAW [Vol. 13:257 
and other start up costs. Banks incur these costs irrespective of the 
number of loans actually made. Because there is a large fixed-cost start­
up expense, the average cost per loan should decrease as a function of the 
number of loans made since the start up cost will be spread over a larger 
number of loans. Therefore, the bank that produces more consumer loans 
should, on average, be able to produce those loans at a lower average cost 
than its less productive competitor, all things being equal. 
More recent studies have specifically investigated whether the 
production of consumer loans, which have high regulatory compliance 
costs, display scale economies. One study found substantial economies of 
scale in compliance with Regulation B. Larger banks spent more on 
compliance than smaller banks, but a 5.7% change in compliance cost was 
accompanied by a 10% change in the amount of credit extended. 193 
A later study found significant economies of scale in compliance 
costs for Regulations Z and B for commercial banks at levels of output of 
up to 375,000 consumer credit accounts, beyond which there are small 
diseconomies of scale. 194 The study concluded that "at the lowest output 
levels, large, unexploited scale economies exist, suggesting that 
Regulations Z and B impose a competitive disadvantage on banks with 
small consumer credit portfolios. Scale economies, however, decrease 
rapidly as output increases and are exhausted at a moderate level of 
output."195 As of this writing, the scale economy question is still 
unresolved. The studies to date do, however, seem to point to a few 
salient conclusions: (1) within banking organizations scales of economy 
are modest; (2) with regard to specific high volume products such as credit 
cards and checking acc'ounts, the scales of economy may be significant; 
and (3) large money center banks do appear to enjoy a cost economy in 
that they can attract capital at a lower cost than their competitors. 196 
In the NAFfA context, some North American bankers may harbor the 
concern that the production of banking products and services could have 
such economies of scale that large banking organizations inevitably will 
193. See Neil B. Murphy, Economies of Scale in the Cost of Compliance with Consumer Credit 
Protection Laws: The Case of the Implementation of the Equal Credit Opponunity Act of 1974, 10 J. 
BANK REsERVES 248, 250 (Winter 1980). The study, however, was based on a very small sample of 
banks, and also evaluated the costs of compliance at the very outset of Regulation B' s existence. This 
data ·may not reflect long run compliance costs because the survey was conducted less than one year 
after the original Regulation B became effective. See GREGORY ELLIEHAUSEN & ROBERT D. KURTZ, 
BOARD OF GoVERNORS OF THE fEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM, SCALE ECONOMIES AND COMPLIANCE 
COSTS FOR CONSUMER CREDIT REGULATION: TRUTH-IN-LENDING AND EQUAL CREDIT OPPORTUNITY 
LAws, Staff Study number 144, I n. 3 (1985). 
194. See ELLIEHAUSEN & KURTZ, supra note 193, at I 0. 

!95. Id. 

196. See RosE, supra note 13, at 106-07 (discussing economy of scale studies). 
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come to dominate the market. 197 The data does not support that 
conclusion. Even if the threat of large banks may be unfounded, however, 
the perception of a threat is as good as a threat for political purposes, so 
community banks in the United States will rail against cross-border 
branching on the theory that U.S. money center banks and their huge 
Canadian and Mexican counterparts will squeeze small community banks 
out of the competitive picture entirely. 
4. Other Aspects of Comparative Advantage 
There certainly are many other factors in the complex web of 
economic forces that tip the balances one way or another in favor of one 
country or the next. One point that cannot be ignored is the strength and 
stability of the home economies in each country. On this point, the United 
States is clearly "head and shoulders" above its two partners. The U.S. 
economy is mature, diverse, and immense. Mexico's and Canada's 
economies are each about ten percent the size of the U.S. economy. 
Canada and Mexico are also both making the transition from being 
primarily natural resources-based economies to being centered more on 
manufacturing and services. A strong U.S. economy means strong U.S. 
banks, which should translate into a comparative advantage. 
Another aspect of comparative advantage is the relative strengths of 
the banking industries as they currently exist. Canadian banks excel at 
retail banking delivered through a wide ranging branch network. 198 With 
nationwide branching in the United States now enacted, the U.S. 
subsidiaries of Canadian banks should be able to exploit this expertise, but 
not as efficiently as they would if they could merely branch from home. 
Canada enjoys an advantage in the Mexican market, which is quite under­
banked and would seem to favor an organization skilled in delivering 
retail banking services. 199 American banks are probably most skilled at 
complying with regulations and, therefore, they should be accorded some 
merit in recognition of this characteristic. 
Another economic fact that will affect the parties' perspectives on the 
branching issue is the cost of funds. Loans made in Mexico frequently are 
197. Of course the data do not clearly support the contention that large banks enjoy economies of 
scale. Hence, the predictions of the demise of the small community bank appear to be greatly 
exaggerated. See generally DONALD R. FRASER & JAMES W. KOLAR!, THE FuTURE OF SMALL BANKS 
IN ADEREGULATED ENVIRONMENT (1985); Paul Nadler Lending Strategies: Why the Community Bank 
Thrives, I COMM. LENDING REV. 71 (Spring 1986). 
198. See Jordan, supra note 3, at 54 (noting that Canadian banks are arguably more competitive 
than U.S. banks in retail banking). 
199. See WHITE, supra note 3, at 17 (opining that Canadian banks have an initial advantage under 
a straight-forward branching scheme). 
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denominated in U.S. dollars. American banks know this, and will be very 
wary about providing easy branching to Mexican banks that will permit 
access to low cost funds through a deposit gathering network. 
Of course, as the only developing country in the NAFfA group, 
Mexico faces some special challenges on the monetary front. Banking 
restrictions on foreign denominated liabilities will prevent Mexican banks 
from becoming too much engaged in the collection of U.S. dollar 
deposits.200 Eliminating the foreign currency restrictions may destabilize 
the peso and will certainly increase the foreign currency exchange risk of 
Mexican banks. Therefore, to the extent Mexican borrowers need U.S. 
dollar-denominated loans, American banks enjoy an advantage. 
VI. WHERE Do WE Go FROM HERE? 
If the cross-border branching issue is considered in isolation, it seems 
unlikely that the status quo will be altered. An optimist would argue that 
at least unanimous Pareto optimal transactions, that is, actions where at 
least one party is made better off and no other party is made worse off, 
should be made. 201 But on closer inspection, it seems that any departure 
from the status quo will have winners and losers (at least in terms of 
comparative advantage), so the universe of potential Pareto optimal moves 
is an empty set. 202 Because changes to the NAFfA require unanimous 
agreement, if the branching provisions are considered in isolation, without 
some countervailing bargaining chip to even out the tradeoffs, a departure 
from the status quo will not occur. It seems likely that the cross-border 
branching issue will not be resolved until there is some exogenous shock 
to the status quo that realigns the interests of the players and regulators in 
the current regime. 
An event on the horizon that could supply that shock is the agreed 
upon renegotiation of insurance powers that must take place before 
January 1, 2000?03 As between the United States and Canada, there are 
not many issues relating to insurance worth fighting about, 204 but the 
Mexican insurance market is still largely closed to foreign investment. 
Given recent changes in the U.S. bank regulatory scheme permitting banks 
200. See Karaoglan & Lubrano, supra note 59, at 31 (noting the regulatory restrictions on Mexican 
banks' exposure to foreign currency risk). 
201. See Maxwell L. Stearns, The Point of Pareto, Dueling Edgeworths, and Assessing 
Institutional Comparative Advantage, in Pl!BUC CHOICE AND PuBLIC LAW: READINGS AND 
COMMENTARY 362 (Maxwell L. Stearns ed., 1997). 
202. See Guido Calebresi, The Pointlessness of Pareto: Carrying Coase Further, 100 YALE L.J. 
1211, 1216 (1991) (noting that objectors to change believe they will1ose something from the change). 
203. See NAFrA, supra note I, Annex 1404.4, 32 I.L.M. at 662. 
204. See Jordan, supra note 3, at 51 (noting that few restrictions on U.S.-Canada insurance activity 
existed before or after the FfA). 
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easier access to the insurance business, the banking lobby may send the 
message to our trade negotiators that Mexican bank branching into the 
U.S. market will be acceptable in exchange for greater access to Mexico's 
insurance market. 
Another possible exogenous shock to the system could be the reform 
of the U.S. federal banking scheme. Such a reform could result in a single 
federal banking regulator205 - secure in its own position - that could enter 
into a NAFTA negotiation without fear of giving up too much domestic 
regulatory power. Recent attempts by Congress to rebalance the power of 
the various federal banking regulators, however, have resulted in 
protracted turf battles without any real progress toward reform, 206 so this 
event may never come to pass. 
Perhaps the shock to the system will result from regulators realizing 
that in the fast changing technological world, borders are increasingly 
irrelevant to the transaction of banking business. Some "banking" 
transactions conducted over the Internet, for example, may escape 
effective regulation by "falling through the cracks" of national borders. 207 
Perhaps through cooperation, international regulators could divide the pie 
of Internet transactions in a way that preserves their relative market 
positions. 
If no dramatic shock materializes, it seems unlikely that the deadlock 
will end. It seems a pity, however, to perpetuate the problematic approach 
to bank expansion currently in place merely because banks perceive 
disadvantages to change. It may be possible, with the appropriate 
leadership, for the various players in the North American financial 
services market to seek out common ground instead of merely defending 
their current turf. From the industry's perspective, some kind of 
harmonization across North America would be highly desirable. It could 
lower compliance costs and make planning much more reliable. When 
viewed through a public choice lens, harmonization may also be 
205. There has been a clamor for a more rational system of banking regulation for several years. 
In a recent Congress the testimony sounded more like a bureaucratic turf battle than a genuine 
articulation of the best route for public policy. Although the immediate prospects for a single federal 
regulator have passed, the idea retains its attractiveness. See GAO Oversight Structure, supra note 12, 
at 78 (calling for a reduction in the number of federal agencies with primary responsibilities for bank 
oversight). 
206. See Kane, Legislative Agenda, supra 145, at 186-88 (noting the turf battle between the 
Federal Reserve Board and the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency over authorization and 
oversight of new banking powers); see also Alan Yonan, Jr., Fed's Greenspan Backs Bank Bill Rubin 
Opposes, WALL ST. J., Mar. 18, 1998, at A6 (describing an incipient turf battle between the Treasury 
Department and the Fed over the structure of the banking industry). 
207. See Richard Blackwell, Under Siege: So What?, FIN. POST, Oct. 4, 1997, at 12, available in 
LEXIS, Canada Library, Finspt File (noting the concern of Canadian regulators that they may be 
losing regulatory authority over "Canadian" banking transactions conducted over the Internet). 
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acceptable to regulators. Harmonization would reduce much of the 
regulatory competition that erodes regulators' market share. By 
standardizing the regulatory product, the regulators could form a cartel to 
control the supply of regulation.208 To proceed in this direction, the 
parties would first need to identify the goals of the NAFTA. It seems the 
foremost goal is to promote the regional development and to facilitate 
trade. This goal, while admirable, is too broad to have any meaning for 
specific industry participants. 
A second goal of the NAFfA is to enhance competition. Liberalizing 
cross-border trade in financial services should increase competition (or at 
least the threat of competition), which could, in turn, reduce prices, help 
eliminate inefficient regulation, and otherwise improve the market for 
financial services. 209 Of course, even if increased competition would be a 
legitimate national goal in a perfect world, it is clearly not something that 
the existing players in the market would welcome. In addition, the 
positive effects of increased competition are not limitless. Much of 
existing banking regulation is intended to rein in competition rather than 
to foster it. In the United States, we have made a public policy choice to 
trade off the benefits of competition for the benefits of a more stable 
banking system.210 A moment's reflection makes clear that perfect 
competition in the financial market is not only unattainable, it is probably 
undesirable as well, because increased competition tends to result in less 
. b"l" 211systermc sta 1 1ty. 
Finally, the NAFT A promotes stability. This goal may be the 
common ground that all the parties can subscribe to. As recently as 1985, 
in Northeast Bancorp, Inc. v. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve 
System,212 the United States Supreme Court stated that "banking and 
related financial activities are of profound local concern."213 Yet, recent 
208. See Kane, Tension, supra note 147, at 34 (articulating the cartel idea). 
209. See Emesto Aguirre, International Economic Integration and Trade in Financial Services: 
Analysis from a Latin American Perspective, 27 LAw & PoL'Y lNT'L Bus. 1057, 1060 (1996) (stating 
that "liberalization may raise the average efficiency of industry, and this should be reflected in lower 
prices for financial services and products."). 
210. See NICHOLAS A. LASH, BANKING LAWS AND REGULATIONS: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 
23 (1987) (noting the value our system places on stability in the banking system). 
211. The U.S. experience with "free banking" during the nineteenth century illustrates the pros and 
cons of unfettered competition. On the good side, the free banking era was marked by almost pure 
competition: barriers to entry were low, there were many participants in the banking market, and 
government interference was kept to a minimum. On the bad side, the era was marked by frequent 
bank failures, unstable money, and widespread fraud. See John Steele Gordon, Understanding the 
S&L Mess, AM. HERITAGE, Feb./Mar. 1991, at 49, 56-58; KERRY COOPER & DONALD R. FRASER, 
BANKING DEREGULATION AND THE NEW COMPETITION IN FINANCIAL SERVICES 46 ( 1984) (providing 
details about the free banking era). 
212. 472 u.s. 159 (1985). 
213. ld. at 177 (quoting Lewis v. B.T.Investment Managers, Inc., 447 U.S. 27,38 (1980)). 
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experiences with the Asian monetary crisis remind us that our domestic 
economy is inextricably entwined with the global economy. In North 
America, the peso crisis of 1994 spilled over into other Latin American 
countries, especially the leading markets of Brazil, Peru, Chile, and 
Argentina.214 When instability of global dimensions shakes the world's 
financial markets, everyone worries. Bankers may find some value in 
rationalizing the international regulatory scheme to enhance stability. 
Inevitably, the banking industry will find itself subject to an 
increasing number of international agreements affecting the trade of 
services generally,215 and the regulation of banking in particular. 
Although multinational trading agreements covering industries as 
complicated as the financial services industry take a long time to evolve, 
on the regulation front banking regulators have begun a movement toward 
greater cooperation.216 The NAFTA itself does not require the signatory 
countries to take any meaningful steps toward harmonization of their 
respective domestic laws regulating financial services, 217 although in the 
securities area, U.S. and Canadian regulators already have worked toward 
and achieved a considerable degree of harmonization of federal, state, and 
provincial securities regulation. 218 
If harmonization does proceed, the negotiators will need to grapple 
with the issue of what role, if any, is left for local control over those 
matters which are of local importance such as lending policies, the 
availability of credit and market-related matters. In North America, this 
question is still very much an open one, exacerbated as it is by the 
differences in economic power and political systems among the three 
countries of the region. We have not yet devised a process that allows 
balancing of all the public and private, local, state, federal, and 
214. SeeSCO"IT& WELLONS, supra note 119, at 1294. 
215. For example, the General Agreement on Trade in Services ("GATS") has already begun to 
have some effect on the international provision of banking services. See generally Simser, supra note 
5 (describing the structure of the GATS and its implications for the trade in financial services). 
216. See Joseph J. Norton, Trends in International Bank Supervision and the Baste Committee on 
Banking Supervision, 48 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 415, 415-19 (1995) (summarizing some of the 
issues confronting the Basle Committee on Banking Supervision). 
217. See Trachtman, supra note 125, at 94 (noting that the NAFTA does not require financial 
regulation harmonization). But see Zamora, Harmonization, supra note 125, at 414-15 (arguing that 
increased cross-border contact between businesspeople, bureaucrats, lawyers, academics and others 
will inevitably lead to an exchange of ideas and accommodation in each of the three countries of the 
cultural differences of the others); Aman. supra note 125 (arguing that global political and economic 
forces push national policies towards various forms of deregulation and privatization). 
218. See Jordan, supra note 3, at 53 (noting that the Canadian scheme of securities regulation is 
modeled after the U.S. scheme and that the regulators have achieved considerable integration). 
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international interests that are affected in cross-border policy-making. 219 
Although the NAFfA reaches across borders, it in some ways only serves 
to reinforce the idea of the nation state,220 in a world informed by the 
public choice perspective it must be so. That perspective aside, however, 
if the governments of the three NAFfA countries truly aspire toward 
improving the lot of their citizens, they must find a way to move beyond 
national politics in order to implement the best practice approaches that 
will benefit everyone in North America. 221 In the end, perhaps one of the 
benefits of trade will be that we begin to think of ourselves more as "North 
Americans" and less as Mexicans, Americans, and Canadians. When we 
begin to forge that common link, the political will to permit trade across 
national borders with no more formality that we now require for interstate 
trade may gain ground and even overcome the resistance of particular 
groups who oppose change because of their own short-term economic 
interests. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
In a perfect world, form follows function. In that world, banking 
organizations that profit from the activities of subsidiaries would bear 
responsibility for their subsidiaries' business, at least to some extent. 
Alternatively, in a world where freedom of choice is highly valued, firms 
would be free to choose whether to organize their operations as 
subsidiaries, branches, or agencies based on the dictates of their own 
business plan rather than the dictates of the regulatory scheme. In the 
world we live in, however, choices are constrained by the parties who 
have an interest in the outcome of the process. In the cross-border 
banking context, that means the regulators who will have to give up power 
under a new system, and market participants who may have to sacrifice 
perceived market advantages embedded in the status quo. For any real 
change to occur, the regulators and the industry participants will have to 
see that change is in their own best interests. Such a change may occur 
through an exogenous shock to the current status quo that forces a 
realignment of interest or through the process of international regulation of 
219. See generally Stephen Zamora, Allocating Legislative Competence in the Americas: The 
Early Experience Under NAFTA and the Challenge of Hemispheric Integration, 19 Hous. J. INT'L L. 
615 (1997) (discussing the problem of balancing legislative power in international policy-making). 
220. See generally Lash, supra note 89 (discussing generally how multinational agreements 
change the nation states, but how they ultimately remain the most important political unit even in a 
multinational world). 
221. See Ruth Buchanan, Border Crossings: NAFTA, Regulatory Restructuring, and the Politics of 
Place, 2 IND J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 371 (1995) (arguing that the NAFrA exacerbated differences 
between localities, industries and labor markets and ignored the complex interaction of labor, capital 
and regulation in the borderlands). 
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financial services designed to lend stability to the world's financial 
markets_ 
